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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION

The Georgia Home Rule System
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Few doctrines attract more universal acclaim than local government
"home rule"; even fewer possess a more convoluted heritage or content.1

* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard
University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. The literature is multifaceted, all-encompassing, overwhelming, and legendary. Only
a sub-set of the offerings includes the following: HOWARD L. McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE
PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1916); JOSEPH D. McGOLDRICK, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF HOME RULE 1916-1930 (1933); OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1982); 1 CHESTER ANTIEAU, ANTIEU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (2d ed. 1997);
C. DALLAS SANDS, ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (2d ed. 1997); DANIEL R. MANDELKER,
ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed. 1996); GERALD E.
FRUG, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (2d ed. 1994); JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1949); Gary Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception,
20 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1973); Gerald Frug, The City As A Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1057 (1980); Kenneth Vanlandingham, MunicipalHome Rule in the United States, 10 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 269 (1968); Jefferson Fordham & Joe Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory
and Practice,9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18 (1948); Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power
Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964).
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As for heritage, difficulty inheres in locating a point of origin, for "home
rule has roots deep in Anglo-American political history."2 As for
content, imprecision begins with terminology itself, for "in point of fact
the term has never been given legal definition and can scarcely be
regarded as a term of our law at all."'
Despite these preliminary obstacles, scholars generally perceive the
home rule concept as a product of the eternal tension between local
governments and the state.4 Historically, that tension manifested itself
in a doctrinal stand-off of epic proportions championed by American legal
giants. Leading one charge Thomas M. Cooley proclaimed for municipalities an "inherent right" of local self-government, an "absolute right"
beyond the control of the state legislature.5 In counterattack John
Dillon strongly denied the existence of any local autonomy, insisting that

2.

1 ANTIEU, supra note 1, § 21.01:
"The principle of home rule, or the right of self-government as to local affairs,
existed before we had a constitution. Even prior to Magna Charta some cities,
boroughs and towns had various customs and liberties, which had been granted
by the crown, or had subsisted through long user, and among them was the right
to elect certain local officers from their own citizens and, with some restrictions,
to manage their own purely local affairs."
Id. (quoting Metropolitan St. R.R. v. Tax Comm'rs, 67 N.E. 69, 70-71 (N.Y. 1903)).
3. McBain, supra note 1, at v. Likewise:
It is very difficult to formulate a precise definition of home rule, inasmuch as
there exists no unanimity of agreement among authorities concerning its meaning.
In a sense, the term represents a metaphor which excites strong emotions and
with some truth Thomas H. Reed has called it a 'state of mind"... . [I]t may be
considered a device for allocating powers and functions between the state and its
municipalities. It may also be considered both a legal and a political concept; legal
in the sense that the allocation of powers and functions rests upon law; and
political in the sense that it involves exercise of political judgment.
Vanlandingham, supra note 1, at 279-80.
4. E.g., "As a legal doctrine, by contrast, home rule does not describe the state or
condition of local autonomy, but a particular method for distributing power between state
and local governments, i.e., a grant of power to the electorate of a local governmental unit
to frame and adopt a charter of government." Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal
Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 645 (1964).
Similarly, "It was thus that the legislatures of the several states came into possession of
a power, the exercise of which presented at a later period of our history the most serious
problem that the American city has encountered in the working out of its salvation."
MCBAIN, supra note 1, at 4.
5. Judge Cooley staked out his position in a concurring opinion in a Michigan case,
LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 93 (1871). The strongest academic support accorded the
inherent right doctrine came from 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 246
(1911). The most forceful rejection of the inherent-right doctrine came from Howard L.
McBain, The Doctrine of An Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REV.
190, 299 (1916).
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all municipal power derived solely from the state legislature.' Moreover, as Dillon's famous "rule" mandated, "any fair, reasonable,
substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the
courts against the [municipal] corporation, and the power is denied."7
Dillon's eventual triumph over Cooley's inherent right theory solidified
the American doctrine of "plenary" state legislative power.8 Under the
plenary precept, or the doctrine of legislative supremacy, the local
government exists as a mere creature of the state, dependent upon the
state legislature for any powers possessed or exercised. It was from
6. 1 JOHN DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-55 (1872). It is a general and
undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable.
7. Id. Again: The extent of the powers of municipalities, whether express, implied,
or indispensable, is one of construction. And here the fundamental and universal rule,

which is as reasonable as it is necessary, is, that while the construction is to be just,
seeking first of all for the legislative intent in order to give it fair effect, yet any ambiguity

or fair, reasonable, substantial doubt as to the extent of the power is to be determined in
favor of the State or general public, and against the State's grantee. Id. Professor Frug
maintains that Dillon's strong position emanated from his belief that local governments
were poorly managed:
Most troubling of all to Dillon, cities were not managed by those "best fitted by
their intelligence, business experience, capacity and moral character." Their
management was "too often both unwise and extravagant." A major change in city
government was therefore needed to achieve a fully public city government
dedicated to the common good. But how could this be achieved? To Dillon, the
answer seemed to lie in state control of cities and in judicial supervision of that
control. State control, though political, was purely public, and the "best fitted"
could more likely be attracted to its government.
Frug, supra note 1, at 1111.
8.
The doctrine of plenary state legislative power means that the state legislature
possesses full authority to provide for the organization and allocation of power to
local government units. Legislative plenary power is limited only by particular
provisions of the state constitution and, of course, by the federal constitution,
notably the equal protection and due process clauses.
MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 37. Again, "(S]tate legislatures have plenary power over local
governments .... These doctrines mean that local governments, in some way, must
receive all the powers they exercise from the state." Id. at 103.
9.
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, and in the absence
of constitutional restrictions, the legislature has absolute control over the number,
nature, and duration of the powers conferred, and the territory over which they
shall be exercised, and may qualify, enlarge, abridge, or entirely withdraw at its
pleasure the powers of a municipal corporation.
CHARLES S. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 61 (1957). Similarly,
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this subservient status that local governments sought alternatives: "[I]s
there any other doctrine in our legal system that gives municipalities
independence and control as to their own affairs?" 10 In response, "[y]es,
there is the doctrine of municipal home rule, not perceived as an
inherent right, but granted by constitution and/or statute in well over
half the states."1 Indeed, "[home rule ...

is seen as a full delegation

of autonomy to local government that can overcome Dillon Rule
restrictions." 2 Finally, "[fIrom its inception municipal home rule has
been primarily directed at freeing cities from irksome legislative
control." 3
America dates its modern home rule development from 1875, the year
in which Missouri included a home rule provision in its state constitution."' From that point of origin, many states have since infused their

[M]unicipalities in the United States are subject to the complete control of the
states in which they are located except as such control is limited by constitutional
provisions. State control of cities and towns has been described as "plenary" ....
Thus, the state may take away the powers of municipalities, may transfer their
functions to other governmental units, and may turn their property over to other
governmental entities without making compensation.
REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 75.
10. Id. at 95.

11. Id.
12. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 128. Again: "Home rule has been said to be intended
to allow localities to decide for themselves the form of local government that they desire
and the scope of its powers." REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 97.
13. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 1, at 299.
14. Professor McBain, in the first book ever published on American local government
home rule, celebrated the event as follows:
It may have been that the members of the Missouri constitutional convention of
1875 analyzed the situation in some such manner as this when they decided to
grant charter-making powers to St. Louis and other cities of more than 100,000
inhabitants. Or it may have been that they were influenced by the analogy of the
relation between the national government and the states. It is to be regretted that
the debates and proceedings of this convention were not published and that so
little is known of the origin of this proposal. Suffice it to say that it marked the
most important step ever taken in the United States in the direction of securing
home rule to cities through the medium of a constitutional provision. The plan
originated, moreover, not in an Eastern state, where with respect to important
cities the problem of legislative control had been slowly evolving aggravating
symptoms, but in a Middle-Western state with a single important city-and that
a city of fairly recent metropolitan growth. To say the least, in spite of Missouri's
thirty-five years of standing as a state, it certainly exemplified something of a
pioneer's daring originality of spirit in the matter of political institutions.
MCBAIN, supra note 1, at 113. Others, although less enthusiastically, also noted the
occasion. "The principle of home rule, or the right of local self-government as to local
affairs, had its beginning in the United States when the people of Missouri in 1875 adopted
a constitutional amendment providing for home rule for its municipalities." RHYNE, supra
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constitutions with home rule systems-systems structured in one guise
or another, falling into one category or another, and operating to one
rule hallmark boasts the
extent or another. Thus, the official home
15
absence of an official home rule hallmark.
Students of the subject commonly define home rule systems as
authorizing local governments to legislatively frame and adopt their own
organizational structures. 6 If the state constitution directly vests that
power in the local government, observers categorize the system as one
of "constitutional home rule." 7 If, contrarily, the constitution empowers the state legislature to effect the authorization, the system falls into
the "legislative home rule" category. 8 Even within those respective

note 9, at 62. "Modern American home rule dates from the adoption of the first
constitutional home rule amendment by Missouri in 1875." 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 1,
§ 21.01. "But the codified form of home rule as we today know it in the United States is
usually said to have started with a Missouri constitutional amendment in 1875."
REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 95.
15. "Because of the diverse wording of the home-rule legislation in the various
jurisdictions, few generalizations concerning the intended ambit of grants of power over
'municipal affairs' or 'municipal functions' can be made." 2 SANDS, supra note 1, § 13.03.
"There are considerable variations in the constitutional language and home rule statutes."
1 ANTIEAU, supra note 1, § 21.01.
16. "It
has been customary to confine the municipal and county home rule terminology
somewhat arbitrarily to the local framing and adoption of charters of government."
FORDHAM, supra note 1, at 74. Similarly,
[t]he procedure by which a municipality may obtain home rule is commonly set
forth in considerable detail in constitutional or statutory provisions. Fundamental
to the process is the drafting of a document usually called a "city charter" or
"home rule charter," which becomes the organic law of that municipality and is
often considered analogous to a constitution.
REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 98.
17. Some authorities further subdivide "constitutional home rule": "Constitutional
home rule clauses take two forms. The original form, dubbed 'imperium in imperio'--a
'state within a state'-grants a defined scope of power to local governments. This form of
home rule usually grants local governments powers over 'municipal' affairs, or over their
'property, affairs and government.'" MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 128. Under "a more
recent form of constitutional home rule ... the constitution grants local governments all
powers the legislature is capable of delegating, but the legislature is authorized to
withdraw or limit home rule powers by statute." Id. at 129.
18. "Ifthe charter-making power comes directly from the constitution,... it is called
constitutional home rule. If enabling legislation is necessary,... the pattern is legislative
home rule." FORDHAM, supra note 1, at 74.
The effect of home rule as a source of local power varies greatly within the home
rule states. The basic source of this power is either (1) constitutional, the selfexecuting state constitutional provision directly conferring home rule authority
upon the local governments; or (2) legislative, the so-called "home rule laws"
passed by the legislature pursuant to constitutional mandate.
1 ANTIEAU, supra note 1, § 21.02.
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classifications, moreover, the systems may assume a variety of shaping
characteristics.
Typical evaluations of a home rule system, whatever its category, focus
upon an assortment of facets. Illustratively, some systems expressly
purport to reverse the "strict construction" mandate of Dillon's Rule by
providing that grants of home rule powers are to be liberally interpreted. 9 Additionally, many systems direct their home rule delegations to
counties as well as municipalities. 20 Finally, the system may formulate
its authorization in any number of descriptions: as conveying powers
relating to "local affairs," powers of "local self-government," or powers
over "local matters."21
Whatever the system's category and features, a two-pronged ramification inevitably emerges from its operation over a period of time in a
given jurisdiction. Ironically, reflection upon that ramification reverts
to the fundamental tension of origin: (1) to what extent the home rule
system serves as a source of power for local governments; and (2) to
what extent the home rule system serves as a source of limitation upon
the state.22

19. "In a number of legislative home rule states, there are constitutional clauses or
amendments stating that grants of power to home rule cities are to be liberally construed
•.. Even absent such a provision, grants of power in home rule acts should be liberally
construed." 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 1, § 21.04.
20. "Within a home rule state, only a limited number of local governments in a state
may actually be exercising home rule powers. One important development is that a
substantial number of the nation's larger urban counties have home rule charters."
MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 129.
Especially notable, so far as home-rule expansion is concerned, has been the
authorization in close to half the states of home rule by the counties. Such rule in
the counties clearly changes their traditional status as little more than subagencies of the states, and it may aggravate problems of overlapping governments
and division of authority.
REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 100.
21. "The language used to define the sphere of self-determination under home-rule
provisions.., varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but either 'local' or 'municipal' usually
appears, as in provisions granting 'powers relating to municipal affairs,' 'powers of local
self-government,' or power over 'local and municipal matters."' 1 SANDS, supra note 1,
§ 4.07.
22.
Analysis suggests that, broadly speaking, constitutional provisions increasing local
independence might have modified the "common law" of municipal corporations
in either of two ways: (1) by granting municipalities the authority to exercise
certain powers without prior authorization from the legislature, or (2) by limiting
the legislature's power to legislate concerning municipal government.
Sandalow, supra note 1 at 648. "Home rule is important to local governments in two
principal ways. First, it is a source of local power. Second, it is a limitation upon legislative
control." 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 1, § 21.02. "The codified form of home rule serves both
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FORMULATION OF THE GEORGIA SYSTEM

Few jurisdictions equaled Georgia's adamant resistance to the home
rule movement. The state's historic devotion to legislative supremacy
held strong for many centuries. Eventually, however (some ninety years
following Missouri's bold experiment), a rather unique home rule system
took its place in the corpus of Georgia local government law. That
system, and its operation now for more than three decades, reflects a
substantial transition in both legal and political philosophy. It is a
transition worthy of account and analysis.

A.

Origin

Following a history of failure in attempting to bring legislative home
rule to fruition for local governments, 23 the 1954 General Assembly
proposed (and the people ratified) an amendment to the Georgia
Constitution:
The General Assembly is authorized to provide by law for the selfgovernment of municipalities and to that end is hereby expressly given
the authority to delegate its powers so that matters pertaining to
municipalities upon which, prior to the ratification of this amendment,

it was necessary for the General Assembly to act, may be dealt with
without the necessity of action by the General Assembly. Any powers

as a grant of power to cities and as a limitation on state control of these same cities."
REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 95. "Much of the litigation regarding home rule has centered
on situations of conflict between state and city law." REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 104.
23. That history encompassed a 1945 constitutional provision mandating the General
Assembly to provide for optional "uniform systems of county and municipal government,"
and "a method by which a county or municipality may select one of the optional uniform
systems or plans or reject any or all proposed systems or plans." GA. CONST. art. XV, § 1,
para. 2 (1945) (amend. 1954). Pursuant to that mandate, the General Assembly enacted
a measure designated as "The Municipal Home Rule Act of 1947" (1947 Ga. Laws 1118),
a statute of both selective applicability and questionable validity. In 1951, the legislature
repealed the 1947 statute and replaced it with "The Municipal Home Rule Law" (1951 Ga.
Laws 116), a statute vesting assorted powers in municipalities electing to avail themselves
of its provisions. Included in the 1951 delegations were powers to frame and adopt
municipal charters, to adopt charter amendments, to incorporate adjacent territories, and
to enjoy "all the power necessary, requisite or proper for the government and administration of... local and municipal affairs.... ." (1951 Ga. Laws at 123). In 1953, in Phillips
v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77, 77 S.E.2d 723, 727 (1953), the Georgia Supreme Court
held that the 1951 statute did not sufficiently follow the optional uniform charter mandates
of the 1945 constitutional provision. Accordingly, the court declared the statute invalidly
delegated legislative power to municipalities and was, in its entirety, unconstitutional. Id.
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granted as provided herein shall be exercised subject only to statutes
of general application pertaining to municipalities.24
Eleven years later,25 the General Assembly put the amendment's
authority in play by enacting "The Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965"
("the Act"). 26 Simultaneously, the legislature proposed yet another
amendment to the constitution, a provision setting out a similar home
rule system for Georgia counties." The ratification of that amendment
in 1966 completed an intriguing local government formulation: a system
of indirect ("legislative") home rule for municipalities and a system of
direct ("constitutional") home rule for counties. These are the Georgia
systems presently in place.28

24. GA. CONST. art. XV, § 1, para. 1 (amended 1954). The provision appears in the
present constitution in the following terms: "The General Assembly may provide by law
for the self-government of municipalities and to that end is expressly given the authority
to delegate its power so that matters pertaining to municipalities may be dealt with
without the necessity of action by the General Assembly." GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para.
2 (1983).
This provision serves as the constitutional basis not only for the home rule statute, but
also for the legislature's delegations of territorial boundary adjustment powers to
municipalities as well. For treatment of those delegations, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The
Law of Municipal Annexation in Georgia: The Evolution of a Concept?, 2 GA. L. REV. 35
(1967); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Annexation in Georgia: Nay-Sayers Beware, 5 GA.
L. REV. 499 (1971); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalAnnexation in Georgia: The Contiguity
Conundrum, 9 GA. L. REV. 167 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalDe-Annexation: The

Ins and the Outs, 27 GA. ST. B.J. 118 (1991).
25. During those intervening years, in 1964, a commission prepared and the legislature
adopted a resolution proposing a new constitution for Georgia. That document contained
express home rule provisions for both counties and municipalities, including the power to
adopt ordinances relating to local government affairs and to amend or repeal local
government charters. 1964 Ga. Laws Ex. Sess. 234, 315. A federal district court held that
because this document had been proposed by a malapportioned general assembly, it could
not be submitted to Georgia voters for ratification in the November, 1964, general election.
Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962). Although the district court's order
was eventually vacated by the United States Supreme Court in Fortson v. Toombs, 379
U.S. 621 (1965), the 1964 constitutional draft was never revived in Georgia.
26. 1965 Ga. Laws 298. This statute, including its subsequent amendments, presently
appears as O.C.G.A. section 36-35-1 through section 36-35-8.
27. 1965 Ga. Laws 752. This provision, as subsequently amended, presently appears
in GA. CONST.art. IX, § 2, para. 1 (1983).

28. For early treatments of the systems, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Home Rule Benefits
or Homemade Problemsfor GeorgiaLocal Governments?,4 GA. ST. B.J. 317 (1968); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., "Home Rule": Its Impact on GeorgiaLocal GovernmentLaw, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 277
(1972); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government "Home Rule": A Place to Stop?, 12 GA. L.
REV. 805 (1978); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Express Exclusions From Home Rule Powers,

URB. GA. MAG. 13 (Feb. 1978). For perspective on Georgia's home rule systems in a
distinctive federal context, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The United States Supreme Court as
Home Rule Wrecker, 34 MERCER L. REV. 363 (1982).

1998]

B.

GEORGIA HOME RULE SYSTEM

107

Content

1. The Municipal Home Rule Act. The Home Rule Act expressly
delegates a number of specific powers to municipalities. These include
the power to fix salary and expenses of employees and members of the
governing authority29 and the power to provide insurance, retirement
and pension benefits, federal program benefits, hospitalization benefits,
and workers' compensation benefits for employees and their dependents.3 ° Additionally, the Act empowers the governing authority to
reapportion municipal election districts following each decennial
census 31 and requires reapportionment to provide newly annexed
electors substantially equal voting power."
The Home Rule Act is also emphatic in reserving to the General
Assembly the power over incorporation, dissolution, merger, consolidation, and other municipal boundary changes.33 Additionally, the
statute expressly excludes from its home rule delegations power over any
matters which the General Assembly preempts by general statute,3 4
and power over the following "matters":35 (1) composition, form, and
procedures for electing or appointing members of the municipal

29. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-4 (1993 & Supp. 1998). Such increases may not become effective
until those elected at the next regular municipal election take office. Covered elective
members of the governing authority include "a mayor, vice-mayor, president or chairman
of a municipal council, member of a municipal council, member of a board of aldermen, or
member of a board of commissioners," or "any person who is appointed to fill a vacancy in
any such elective office." Id. § 36-35-4(b). Additionally, "salary or compensation" includes
'any expense allowance or any form of payment or reimbursement of expenses, except
reimbursement for expenses actually and necessarily incurred by members of a municipal
governing authority in carrying out their official duties." Id. § 36-35-4(c).
30. Id. § 36-35-4(d).
"'[Rletirement' and 'pension' shall mean termination from
municipal service with the right to receive a benefit based upon all or part of such
municipal service in accordance with the terms of the ordinance or contract pursuant to
which the municipality provides for payment of such benefits." Id.
31. Id. § 36-35-4.1. Reapportioned districts must be formed of contiguous territory and
variations in district populations must comply with federal one person-one vote
requirements. Id. § 36-3-4.1(b)(1)-(2).
32. Id. § 36-35-4.1(a). This reapportionment is "limited to making only those
adjustments in district boundary lines as may be reasonably necessary to include the newly
annexed territory within such'districts." Id. § 36-35-4.1(c).
33. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-2 (1993 & Supp. 1998). Boundaries can not be changed "except
by local Act of the General Assembly or by such methods as may be provided by general
law." Id. § 36-35-2(a).
34. Id. § 36-35-6(a). "[Sluch matters shall be the subject of general law or the subject
of local Acts of the General Assembly. . . ." Id.
35. Id.
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governing authority;36 (2) state criminal offenses;37 (3) taxation;3 8 (4)
eminent domain;3 9 (5) businesses regulated by the Public Service
Commission; 4° (6) court jurisdictions; 41 (7) independent school4 systems; 42 and (8) civil laws governing private or civil relationships. 1
The foundational essence of the Home Rule Act consists of two
"legislating" delegations. First, the governing authority may "adopt
clearly reasonable ordinances, resolutions, or regulations relating to its
property, affairs, and local government for which no provision has been
made by general law and which are not inconsistent with the Constitution or any charter provision .... , On the one hand, this delegation
does not restrict the General Assembly's power, by general law, to refine,
broaden, limit, or otherwise regulate the municipal power exercise.45
On the other hand, the legislature cannot, by local statute, "repeal,
modify, or supersede" municipal action under the delegation.4 6
The Act's most dramatic delegation47 authorizes the municipality, "as
an incident of its home rule power, [to] amend its charter by following
either of ... [two] procedures." 4 First, the governing authority may
accomplish the charter amendment "by ordinances duly adopted at two
regular consecutive meetings"4 9 following specified notice of the
ordinance ° and its availability to the public.5

36. Id. § 36-35-6(a)(1).
37. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a)(2)(A) (1993 & Supp. 1998). Additionally, actions providing
for confinement in excess of six months, and actions providing for fines and forfeitures in
excess of $1,000. Id. § 36-35-6(a)(2)(B), (C).
38. Id. § 36-35-6(a)(3). I.e., "any form of taxation beyond that authorized by law or by
the Constitution." Id.
39. Id. § 36-35-6(a)(4).
40. Id. § 36-35-6(a)(5). I.e., "expanding the power of regulation over any business
activity." Id.
41. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a)(6) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
42. Id. § 36-35-6(a)(7).
43. Id. § 36-35-6(b). I.e., "the power to take any action affecting the private or civil law
governing private or civil relationships, except as is incident to the exercise of an
independent governmental power." Id.
44. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(a) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Indeed, this is the delegation-the power of charter amendment-which goes to
define the substance of "home rule" itself.
48. Id. § 36-35-3(b).
49. Id. § 36-35-3(b)(1). Those meetings must be held "not less than seven nor more
than 60 days apart." Id.
50. This notice must provide a synopsis of the proposed charter amendment and must
be published in the available local newspaper "once a week for three weeks within a period
of 60 days immediately preceding ... final adoption." Id. The notice must also state that
a copy of the amendment is in the office of the municipal clerk and in the office of the clerk
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The second procedure is initiated by a petition filed with the governing
authority by a requisite percentage of the municipality's population5 2

and stating the proposed charter amendment's "exact language."53 The
governing authority must determine the petition's validity within fifty
days and either call for an election 54 or publish "reasons why such

petition is not valid."5 The governing authority must publish notice
of the election in the available local newspaper "once a week for two
weeks immediately preceding such date."56

The notice must also

provide a synopsis of the proposed amendment and state a copy is on file
for public examination.5 7 In the election, the charter amendment
prevails upon approval of "more than one-half of the votes cast";58 in
the event of failure, no referendum may be held on the amendment
"more often than once each year."59

of superior court and may be there examined by the public. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(1) (1993
& Supp. 1998).
51. Id. "The recording officer of the municipal governing authority shall furnish
anyone, upon written request, a copy of the proposed amendment." Id. The statute
prohibits use of this type of charter amendment by the governing authority to change or
repeal a charter amendment accomplished by referendum (described infra), or to change
or repeal "a local Act of the General Assembly ratified in a referendum by the electors of
the municipal corporation unless at least 12 months have elapsed after such referendums."
Id. Finally, "[n]o amendment [by the governing authority] shall be valid if provision has
been made therefor by general law." Id.
52. Id. § 36-35-3(b)(2)(A). I.e., 25% of the registered voters of a municipality with a
population of 5,000 or less; 20% of the registered voters of a municipality with a population
from 5,000 to 100,000; and 15% of the registered voters of a municipality with a population
of more than 100,000. Id.
53. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(2)(A) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
54. Id. The call for the election "shall be issued within one week after the determination of the validity of the petition." Id.
55. Id. § 36-35-3(b)(2)(B). The governing authority must publish the reasons in the
available local newspaper in the week following the date on which the petition is declared
invalid. Id.
56. Id. § 36-35-3(b)(2)(A).
57. Id. I.e., in the office of the municipal recording officer and in the office of the clerk
of the superior court. The recording officer "shall furnish anyone, upon written request,
a copy of the proposed amendment." Id.
58. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(2)(A) (1993 & Supp. 1998). The municipality must bear the
cost of the election, and the governing authority must canvass the returns and declare the
results. Finally, "[n]o amendment [by voter petition] shall be valid if provision has been
made therefor by general law." Id.
59. Id.
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Whether accomplished by the governing authority or via voter petition,
the municipal charter amendment is not effective until filed with the
Secretary of State and in the office of the clerk of the superior court.60
2. The County Home Rule Constitutional Provision, When the
General Assembly enacted the 1965 Home Rule Act for municipalities,
it possessed no constitutional power to include counties. 6' In order to

provide for counties, rather, the legislature was limited to proposing a
constitutional amendment.6 2

With the voters' ratification of that

amendment in 1966, counties drew their home rule status directly from
the constitution itself.63
The county constitutional provision's structure is highly similar to that
of the municipal statute. The provision expressly empowers the county
governing authority to fix the salary, compensation, and expenses of its
employees.6 4 Additionally, the governing authority may "establish and
maintain retirement or pension systems, insurance, workers' compensation, and hospitalization benefits for [those] employees."65
The provision is likewise emphatic in excluding from its delegations
matters preempted by the General Assembly by general statute,66 as
well as power over the following "matters": 7 (1) elective county offices,
their salaries and personnel; 61 (2) composition, form, procedure for
election or appointment, compensation, and expenses and allowances of
the governing authority;69 (3) criminal offenses or punishment; 70 (4)

60. Id. § 36-35-5. The file must also contain a copy of the requisite notice of publication
and an affidavit of a newspaper representative that the notice received the prescribed
publication. "The secretary of state shall provide for the publication and distribution of all
such amendments and revisions at least annually." Id.
61. GA. CONST. art. XV, § 1, para. 1 (amended 1976): "The General Assembly is
authorized to provide by law for the self-government of municipalities . . . ." Id. The
provision presently appears in GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 2. See the discussion of this
provision supra.
62. 1965 Ga. Laws 752.
63. The provision presently appears in GA.CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1.
64. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. l(f).
65. Id.
66. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c).
67. Id. These matters "shall be the subject of general law or the subject of local acts
of the General Assembly. . . ." Id.
68. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(1): "Action affecting any elective county office,
the salaries thereof, or the personnel thereof, except the personnel subject to the
jurisdiction of the county governing authority." Id.
69. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(2).
70. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(3).
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taxation;71 (5) businesses regulated by the Public Service Commission;72 (6) eminent domain; 73 (7) public school systems; 74 and (8) civil
laws governing private or civil relationships. 5
As for its crucial "legislating" delegations, the provision authorizes the
county governing authority to "adopt clearly reasonable ordinances,
resolutions, or regulations relating to its property, affairs, and local
government for which no provision has been made by general law and
which is not inconsistent with this Constitution or any local law ....
76
This authorization does not restrict the General Assembly's power, by
general law, to further define the power delegated or to broaden, limit,
or otherwise regulate its exercise. 7 The legislature cannot, however,
by local statute, "repeal, modify, or supersede" county action under the
delegation. v
Finally, the provision authorizes the county, "as an incident of its
home rule power," to amend or repeal "the local acts applicable to its
governing authority by following either of [two] procedures .... "79
First, the governing authority may accomplish the amendment or repeal
"by a resolution or ordinance duly adopted at two regular consecutive
meetings" ° following specified notice of the measure"' and its availability to the public. 2

71.

GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(4). "Action adopting any form of taxation beyond

that authorized by law or by this Constitution." Id.
72. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(5). "Action expanding the power of regulation
over any business activity regulated by the Georgia Public Service Commission beyond that
authorized by law or by this Constitution." Id.
73. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(6).
74. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(8).
75. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(d). "[Amny action affecting the private or civil law
governing private or civil relationships, except as is incident to the exercise of an
independent governmental power." Id.
76. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(a). Such local statutes shall remain effective until
amended or repealed by the governing authority or by voter petition as described infra.
Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. l(b).
80. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(1). Those meetings must be held "not less than
seven nor more than 60 days apart." Id.
81. Id. The notice must contain a synopsis of the proposed amendment or repeal and
be published in the official county organ "once a week for three weeks within a period of
60 days immediately preceding its final adoption." Id.
82. Id. The notice must state that a copy of the proposed amendment or repeal is in
the office of the clerk of the superior court for public examination. The clerk "shall furnish
anyone, upon written request, a copy of the proposed amendment or repeal." Id. The
provision prohibits use of this type of amendment or repeal by the governing authority to
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The second procedure is initiated by a petition filed with the county
probate judge by a requisite percentage of the county's population,"
stating the "exact language" of the proposed amendment or repeal. 4
The probate judge must determine the petition's validity within sixty
days and either call an election" or publish "reasons why such petition
is not valid."86 The judge must publish notice of the election in the
county organ "once a week for three weeks immediately preceding such
date."8" The notice must also provide a synopsis of the proposed
amendment or repeal and state a copy is on file for public examination.88 At the election, the amendment or repeal carries if approved by
"more than one-half of the votes cast"; 9 in the event of failure, no
referendum
may be held on the measure "more often than once each
°
year. 9
Whether accomplished by the governing authority or via voter petition,
an amendment to or repeal of a local statute is not effective until filed
with the Secretary of State. 9'

change or repeal an amendment accomplished by referendum (described infra), or to change
or repeal "a local act of the General Assembly ratified in a referendum by the electors of
such county unless at least 12 months have elapsed after such referendum." Id. Finally,
"[n]o amendment [by the governing authority] shall be valid if inconsistent with any
provision of this Constitution or if provision has been made therefor by general law." Id.
83. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(2). I.e., 25% of the registered voters of a county
with a population of 5,000 or less; 20% of the registered voters of a county with a
population of 5,000 to 50,000; and 10% of the registered voters of a county with a
population of more than 50,000. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The call for the election "shall be issued not less than ten nor more than 60
days after the date of the filing of the petition." Id.
86. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(2). The probate judge must publish the reasons
in the county organ in the week immediately following the date on which the petition is
declared invalid. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. I.e., in the office of the probate judge. The judge "shall furnish anyone, upon
written request, a copy of the proposed amendment or repeal." Id.
89. Id. The county must bear the cost of the election and the judge must canvass the
returns and declare the results. Finally, no amendment or repeal by either the governing
authority or by voter petition shall deal with matters "which the General Assembly by
general law has preempted or may hereafter preempt, but such matters shall be the subject
of general law or the subject of local acts of the General Assembly. . . ." GA. CONST. art.
IX, § 2, para. 1(c).
90. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(2).
91. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(g). The file must also contain a copy of the requisite
notice of publication and an affidavit of a newspaper representative that the notice received
the prescribed publication. "The Secretary of State shall provide for the publication and
distribution of all such amendments and revisions at least annually." Id.
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C. The Constitution'sSupplementary Powers Provision ("Amendment
19")
In 1972, the voters ratified an amendment to the Georgia Constitution
typically characterized as the "supplementary powers" provision, or
"Amendment 19. " 92 Although not technically a part of the "home rule"
systems (it does not authorize the local government to change its charter
or local statutes), the provision deserves mention in this context.
In exceedingly expansive fashion, Amendment 19 declares itself "[iun
addition to and supplementary of all powers possessed by or conferred"
upon local governments. 93 The provision asserts that "any county,
municipality, or any combination thereof may exercise the following
powers and provide the following services."94 At that juncture the
provision summarily enumerates a broad array of functions and services:
police and fire; garbage and solid waste; public health facilities; streets
and roads; parks; water collection and disposal; water treatment and
distribution; public housing; public transportation; libraries; terminals,
docks, and parking; codes; air quality control; and retirement or pension
systems. 5
The provision concludes by sketching its impact upon the General
Assembly's continuing power to treat the enumerated subjects. Thus the
legislature "shall act upon the subject matters listed ... only by general
law."9" Those general statutes, moreover, may only regulate, restrict,
or limit "the [local government's] exercise of the powers listed"; they
"may not withdraw any such powers. " 9'
D.

In Summary

In 1965, the Georgia General Assembly finally utilized authority
provided by a 1954 constitutional provision to enact the Municipal Home
Rule Act. In 1966, Georgia voters ratified a constitutional amendment
conveying highly similar home rule powers to counties. Both systems
expressly delegate several specified powers to local governments; both
systems also emphatically exclude from their delegations a host of
enumerated subjects.

92. 1972 Ga. Laws 1552.
1972 general election ballot.
para. 3.
93. GA. CONST. art. IX, §
94. Id.
95. GA. CONST. art. IX, §
96. GA. CONST. art. IX, §
97. GA. CONST. art. IX, §

The reference derived from the amendment's position on the
The provision presently appears in GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2,
2, para. 3(a).
2, para. 3(a)(1)-(14).
2, para. 3(d).
2, para. 3(c).
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Far more indigenous to historic "home rule," the systems authorize
local governments to legislate generally on unspecified subjects. This
two-tiered delegation includes, first, the governing authority's adoption
of "clearly reasonable" measures not covered by general or existing local
statutes. Second, the local government is empowered to change
pertinent local statutes by either of two procedures. One procedure vests
the amending or repealing power in the local governing authority. The
other process encompasses change by voter petition and referendum
approval. Measures adopted under both procedures must be filed with
the Secretary of State who provides for their annual publication.
Finally, a 1972 constitutional amendment, although not technically a
component of the home rule system, authorizes local government action
over a range of expansively errumerated subjects. Moreover, those
subjects may not be treated by local statutes, nor even by general
statutes which withdraw local government power.
Since 1965, therefore, students of local government law have observed
with intrigue the continuing evolution of Georgia's home rule system.
III.

LITIGATION UNDER THE SYSTEM

In place for over three decades, the Georgia home rule system has
drawn its share of litigation. Although contrasting in origins, and
differing in details, the municipal and county home rule measures
contain many similar features. Both the differences and the similarities
have generated issues for judicial determination.
A.

Municipal and County Home Rule in the Courts

1. Specifically Delegated Powers. As described, both home rule
systems make express grants of several specific powers to local
governments. On occasion those grants precipitate legal quandaries

98. A fundamental legal issue underlying the two systems is whether, because of their
contrasts in origin, the systems should receive different judicial constructions. As noted,
municipalities derive their home rule status indirectly by legislative implementation of
constitutional authorization. In contrast, counties obtain home rule status directly, without
legislative participation, under a delegation from the constitution itself. For the early
suggestion that these contrasting origins might indeed support differing judicial
treatments, and that the difference might augur in favor of the "direct" county system, see
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Home Rule Benefits or Homemade Problems for Georgia Local
Government?, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 317, 326 (1968). For the similar indication that the contrasts
in origins justify distinct interpretations, but that the distinction works in favor of the

"indirect" municipal system, see the controlling opinion in the Georgia Supreme Court's
treatment of PlantationPipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 7, 178 S.E.2d 868, 873
(1970) (involving the issue of municipal annexation rather than municipal home rule).

1998]

GEORGIA HOME RULE SYSTEM

115

whose resolutions may, in turn, draw legislative reaction. Illustratively,
the county home rule constitutional provision originally included among
its specific delegations the power to enact planning and zoning
ordinances for unincorporated areas.9 9 In the early case of Johnston v.
Hicks, °° the Georgia Supreme Court held that grant to work an
"implied repeal";'1 1 accordingly, the legislature "no longer [has] the
power to enact local laws concerning planning and zoning for unincorporated areas."0 2 Whether or not prompted by Johnston, the specific
grant of the zoning power subsequently suffered deletion from the home
rule constitutional provision. 0 3
The supreme court's approach in Johnston carried over to the later
case of Richmond County v. Pierce,1°4 in which there was a controversy
over a county employee's retirement payments.' 5 In resolving Pierce
the court isolated the home rule constitutional provision's specific
authorization of retirement or pension systems.0

6

That express grant,

the court asserted, vested "sole authority" in the county governing body
and "divested the General Assembly of authority to enact a retirement
Act for [the] County."1 7 Once again, therefore, the provision's specific
grant of power illustrated the dual-pronged ramifications of "home rule":
(1) increasing the local government's power to deal with issues of local

99. 1965 Ga. Laws 752, 757, GA. CONST. art. XV, § 2, para. 1 (1945). The provision
expressly vested that power in the governing authority of each county.
100. 225 Ga. 576, 170 S.E.2d 410 (1969).
101. The court reasoned that "the earlier constitutional provisions were impliedly
repealed by the Home Rule Amendment." Id. at 581, 410 S.E.2d at 413.
102. Id.
103. No longer a part of the home rule provision, the matter receives the following
treatment by the present constitution: "The governing authority of each county and of each
municipality may adopt plans and may exercise the power of zoning. This authorization
shall not prohibit the General Assembly from enacting general laws establishing procedures for the exercise of such power." GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4.
104. 234 Ga. 274, 215 S.E.2d 665 (1975).
105. The county rejected the claim of a former county attorney, contending that a local
statute amending the county retirement system was invalid "because said Act is proscribed
by virtue of the 'County Home Rule Amendment' to the Georgia Constitution," Id. at 276,
215 S.E.2d at 667.
106. Id. at 281, 215 S.E.2d at 670. "The governing authority of each county is
authorized to fix the salary, compensation, and expenses of those employed by such
governing authority and to establish and maintain retirement or pension systems,
insurance, workers' compensation, and hospitalization benefits for said employees." GA.
CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(f).
107. 234 Ga. at 280-81, 215 S.E.2d at 670. Thus, the court held the former employee
in error in relying upon the local statute which purported to amend the county's retirement
plan. Id. at 281, 215 S.E.2d at 671.
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concern; and (2) decreasing the state legislature's control over local
issues.
Litigation under the municipal system's specific delegations may
likewise prompt legislative response. The Municipal Home Rule Act
empowers the governing authority to increase the salary, compensation,
and expenses of its members, but limits those increases to members
elected at the next election. 0 8 Savage v. City of Atlanta °9 featured
a taxpayer challenge to ordinances providing instant monthly expense
payments to council members and increasing the present compensation
of both the mayor and the council president."0 Holding neither salary
increase subject to the statutory limitation, the supreme court reasoned
that neither the mayor nor the president was a member of "the
municipal governing authority.""' Under the municipal charter, the
court held neither official possessed "legislative power,"" 2 and each
was free to receive the immediate compensation increases."13 The
court did, however, invalidate the expense payments to the council:
those payments were "tantamount to the payment of compensation
rather than the reimbursement of expenses";. as such, they triggered
the home rule prohibition against the governing authority's increasing
its own salary.'1 5
In an immediate response to Savage, the General Assembly broadened
the postponement limitation of the Home Rule Act: "'[E]lective members
of the municipal governing authority'. . . specifically includ[e] a mayor,
vice-mayor, president or chairman of a municipal council, member of a

108. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-4(a)(a)(1) (1993 & Supp. 1998). "Any such increase shall not be
effective until after the taking of office of those elected at the next regular municipal
election which is held immediately following the date on which the action to increase the
compensation was taken." Id. § 36-35-4(a)(1).
109. 242 Ga. 671, 251 S.E.2d 268 (1978).
110. Id. at 671, 251 S.E.2d at 269. All the increases were enacted by the municipal
council and became effective by operation of law without the mayor's signature. Id. at 67273, 251 S.E.2d at 270.
111. Id. at 675, 251 S.E.2d at 271.
112. Id. "Indetermining whether a municipal officer is part of the governing authority
of the municipality, the question is whether that municipal officer possesses legislative
power." Id. As for the mayor, he was vested with "all executive and administrative powers
of the city"; as for the council president, the city charter expressly provides that he is not
to be a council member. Id. at 677, 251 S.E.2d at 272.
113. Id. at 676, 271 S.E.2d at 272.
114. Id. at 679, 251 S.E.2d at 273. "We arrive at this conclusion, particularly because
the council members are still reimbursed for other expenses upon submission of
documentation that the expenses were actually incurred by them." Id.
115. Id. "The ordinance is invalid under [the Home Rule Act], because this.., statute
mandates that any increase in the compensation of the elective members of the municipal
governing authority shall not be effective until the term after it is voted on." Id.
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municipal council, member of a board of aldermen, or member of a board
of commissioners."116 The legislature also perfected its perception of
"salary or compensation": those words "include any expense allowance
or any form of payment or reimbursement of expenses, except reimbursement for expenses actually and necessarily incurred by members of a
municipal governing authority in carrying out their official duties." 7
From the beginning, therefore, the specific authorizations contained
in Georgia's home rule systems have attracted controversy. Judicial
resolution of that controversy serves to illuminate the essential contours
of the home rule concept. Those resolutions may also provoke system
"corrections" in formulation.
2. Express Exclusions. As recounted, both home rule measures
emphatically reserve to the General Assembly-thus expressly excluding
from local government control-a host of enumerated "matters."1 8 It
is no surprise that these "express exclusions" account for a major portion
of home rule litigation. In each instance the appellate courts place an
asserted home rule power on one side or the other of the exclusionary
lines. This evolving body of decisional law etches in sharp relief a
pulsating profile of Georgia's home rule system.
a. The GoverningAuthority. As previously sketched, each home rule
measure expressly excludes from its delegation purview the power over
foundational facets of the local governing authority. Such elements as
composition, form of government, and election procedures, for example,
all constitute "matters" expressly posted outside the home rule preserve. 1 9 These exclusions claimed linchpin significance in the case of
Jackson v. Inman,'2 a challenge to a local statute enacting a new
charter for an existing municipality.'2 ' Such charter changes, challenger maintained, fell within exclusive municipal control under the
Home Rule Act. 22 Rejecting that position, the supreme court focused

116. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-4(b) (1993 & Supp. 1998). This is true, "notwithstanding any
terminology or designation of a municipal governing authority or governing body contained
in any municipal charter... ." Id.
117. Id. § 36-35-4(c).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
119. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a), (1)(a); GA. CONST.art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(2).
120. 232 Ga. 566, 207 S.E.2d 475 (1974).
121. Id. at 566, 207 S.E.2d at 476. The challenger, the municipal police chief, protested
his change in status under the new charter and hence the legislature's authority to enact
the charter via local or special statute. Id.
122. Id. at 569, 207 S.E.2d at 477. "The essential question we face in reviewing the
constitutionality of [the] 'New Charter' Act is whether this special act was necessary to
authorize the City to make the changes made in its government or whether these changes
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upon the Act's express exlusions: "The General Assembly has reserved
the legislative power to enact new charters for existing cities when such
charters include drastic changes in the composition and form of city

government and the election and terms of office of the members of the
governing authority ....

,1...Consequently, the court sustained the

validity of the special act, for "the power to adopt [this] entirely new
124

charter ... cannot be found in ... the present home rule statutes."
Three years later in Bruck v. City of Temple,"2 the court moved to
distance its decision in Jackson. Bruck featured an attack upon a home
rule ordinance broadening municipal election districts to encompass
newly annexed territory.'26 The challengers relied squarely upon the
Home Rule Act's express exclusion regarding composition, form, and
procedure for electing members of the governing authority.'27 The
ordinance's change of city election districts, challengers contended, flew
in the teeth of that exclusion. In response the court posted Jackson as
its settled construction of the "governing authority" exclusion. There it
was held "that such fundamental and substantive changes in city
government could not be made by the municipality under general home
rule laws."12 That construction did not reach the Bruck ordinance, the
court insisted, because it is an ordinance "merely" implementing an
annexation effected by local statute, and thus "not an unauthorized
exercise of home rule power."' 29 If Jackson stood at one extreme on

could be made by the City under the general home rule laws." Id.
123. Id. at 569-70, 207 S.E.2d at 478. The court stressed the magnitude of the changes
effected by the new charter: "[T]he city government has been changed drastically firom a
strong commission form of government ...

to a new form of government ...

requiring a

classic separation of powers not contained in the old form of government." Id. at 569, 207
S.E.2d at 478.
124. Id. at 570, 207 S.E.2d at 478. "Consequently, this legislative power still resides
in the General Assembly under the Constitution." Id.
125. 240 Ga. 411, 240 S.E.2d 876 (1977).
126. Id. at 411, 240 S.E.2d at 877-78. The annexation had been effected by a local
statute which made no provision for election district accommodation for the new municipal
citizens. The subsequent ordinance constituted an amendment to the municipal charter;
it was properly adopted, the court held, under the Home Rule Act's authorization for
charter amendments by the municipal governing authority. Id. at 412, 240 S.E.2d at 878.
127. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(1) (1993 & Supp. 1998). Challengers were residents of a
previously unincorporated area annexed into the municipality by the local statute. 240 Ga.
at 411, 240 S.E.2d at 817.
128. 240 Ga. at 416, 240 S.E.2d at 880. The court described the changes at issue in
Jackson as "a vast administrative reorganization of city government." Id.
129. Id. The court employed the same rationale to reject challengers' argument that
the ordinance ran afoul of the home rule statute's command that "[nlo amendment
hereunder shall be valid to change or repeal ... a local Act of the General Assembly
ratified in a referendum by the electors of such municipality unless at least 12 months
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the "governing authority 1exclusion"
continuum, the court indicated, then
30
Bruck stood at the other.
County ordinances likewise suffered challenge under the "governing
authority" exclusion; again, the supreme court found itself structuring
demarcations of coverage. Guhl v. Williams 131 featured home rule
ordinances amending a local statute to increase the commissioners'
power over county personnel.'32 In opposition, the commission chairman tendered the exclusion: 1 3 "[Tihe proposed ordinances would
drastically alter the form of [county] government ... .1 34 Responding
only by way of conclusion, the court simply denied that the ordinances
"would... bring about a change in the 'form' of the government of [the]
[c]ounty as the word 'form' is used in" the home rule provision's

exclusion. 131
Similar intragovernmental conflicts crossed the line.
Gray v.
Dixon 13 6 presented a commission chairman's challenge to two home
rule ordinances. 3 v In assessing that challenge, the court first focused
upon an ordinance removing the chairman as chief executive officer of
the county. That measure, the court asserted, "would be action ...
changing the form of county government which, under the County Home
Rule Amendment, a county is not permitted to take." 13 ' The second ordi-

have elapsed after such referendums." Id. at 415, 240 S.E.2d at 880 (citing O.C.G.A. § 3635-3(b)(1)). The court responded as follows: "The appellants' reliance on this Code
provision is misplaced because the municipal ordinance did not 'change or repeal,' but
rather implemented, the local annexation Act." Id. at 415, 240 S.E.2d at 880.
130. Id. at 416, 240 S.E.2d at 880. Four years after the supreme court's decision in
Bruck, the General Assembly amended the municipal home rule statute to expressly
empower the governing authority to amend its charter in order to reapportion the
municipal election districts following each decennial census and following the annexation
of additional territory to the corporate boundaries. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-4.1(a), (c).
131. 237 Ga. 586, 229 S.E.2d 382 (1976).
132. Id. at 586-87, 229 S.E.2d at 383. "The net result of the two proposed ordinances
would diminish the power of the Chairman, as provided for in the 1956 Local Act, and
increase the power of a majority of the Board of Commissioners with respect to the
employment and discharge of non-merit system employees of the county." Id.
133. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(2).
134. 237 Ga. at 588, 229 S.E.2d at 384.
135. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's decision that the home rule
ordinances would validly repeal the local statute. Id.
136. 249 Ga. 159, 289 S.E.2d 237 (1982).
137. Id. at 160, 289 S.E.2d at 239. The commissioners sought to adopt the ordinances
under their home rule authority in order to amend previously controlling local statutes.
Id.
138. Id. at 164, 289 S.E.2d at 241.
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nance, although purportedly a less drastic measure, fared no better.139 By conferring "'executive powers' on the office of county
manager," that ordinance as well suffered exclusion as 0"'action affecting
14
the ... form ... of the county governing authority.'"
In summary, the matter of the governing authority stands expressly
excluded by both systems from their home rule delegations to local
governments.
This matter constitutes, the litigated controversies
manifest, a matter of degree.
b. Taxation. Another subject expressly excluded from the home rule
authorizations is "[a]ction adopting any form of taxation." 41
The
supreme court first employed this exclusion in Richmond County
Business Ass'n v. Richmond County'11 to invalidate an ordinance fixing
an "annual and specific occupation tax and licenses." 143 Finding the
144
ordinance concerned primarily with revenue rather than regulation,
the court termed it a tax rather than a scheme of licensing.'43 So
characterized, the measure could find no authorization in the constitution's home rule provision: "[Tihis Amendment specifically negatives
authority to impose taxes and declares that such
authority must be
14
found elsewhere in the laws or the Constitution." 1
The court remained equally unreceptive to the county's second effort,
a reformulated ordinance admittedly more regulatory in nature and selfdesignated a "license fee." 47 Unconvinced, however, that the county's
purpose was not "primarily revenue-producing,"'" the court again
condemned the ordinance: "[Tihe Home Rule Amendment ..."clearly
149
prohibits action in the areas of ...additional forms of taxation.

139. Id. "Likewise, the only difference in the two ordinances proposing the creation of
the office of county manager is that the first purported to make the county manager the
'chief executive officer' of the county." Id.
140. Id.
141. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(4); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a)(3).
142. 224 Ga. 854, 165 S.E.2d 293 (1968).
143. Id. at 854, 165 S.E.2d at 294.
144. "Nowhere in the ordinance are there any provisions that regulate the conduct of
the businesses and professions." Id. at 856, 165 S.E.2d at 295.
145. Id. at 855, 165 S.E.2d at 294. "The distinction between a tax and a license is not
one of names but of substance. A tax is primarily intended to produce revenue, while a
license is primarily intended for regulation under the police power." Id. at 856, 165 S.E.2d
at 295.
146. Id. at 857, 165 S.E.2d at 295.
147. Richmond County v. Richmond County Bus. Ass'n, 225 Ga. 568, 170 S.E.2d 246
(1969).
148. Id. at 571, 170 S.E.2d at 248. The court reasoned that ability to pay was strongly
suggested as the basis for the ordinance. Id. at 570-71, 170 S.E.2d at 248.
149. Id. at 571, 170 S.E.2d at 248.
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Dekalb County v. Brown Builders Co.' featured a slightly different
county approach: an ordinance imposing an additional charge upon
applicants for building permits and allocating the resulting funds to
county schools.'5 1 Because the measure constituted "a tax or a charge
imposed for ...

collecting revenue," 5 ' the court undertook the search

for authorization. Focusing upon the county home rule provision's
153
express exclusion of taxation, the court invalidated the ordinance.
The court held firm in reviewing the challenged measure of Chanin v.
Bibb County,'54 an ordinance imposing a charge upon wholesale beer
deliveries. Rejecting the county description of the ordinance as
"regulatory,"5 5 the court ferreted "purpose" from effect. The ordinance's effect was to raise revenue via "a tax imposed upon certain
wholesale purchases of beer."5 6 "[Niothing," the court emphasized, "in
the Home Rule for Counties amendment to" 157
the Georgia Constitution...
grants to counties any new power to tax.

The court of appeals followed a similar approach in City of Tunnel Hill
v. Ridley, 55 presenting a challenge to a municipal occupation tax.
There the municipality sought to defend the tax by arguing the
delegation of power it professed to receive from the Municipal Home
Rule Act.'59 The court rejected the defense: "By the clear and unambiguous terms of that statute, if a particular form of taxation is not
authorized by law or by the Constitution, municipal corporations may
not adopt it."160

150. 227 Ga. 777, 183 S.E.2d 367 (1971).
151. Id. at 777, 183 S.E.2d 368. The county argued the charge would constitute a fee.

Id.
152. Id. at 778, 183 S.E.2d at 368. "Obviously the funds are not for the purpose of
regulation and control of the building industry." Id.
153. Id. at 778-79, 183 S.E.2d at 369. "Neither do we find authority for [the] county's
action in... the Georgia Constitution providing home rule for counties . . . ." Id. at 779,
183 S.E.2d at 369.
154. 234 Ga. 282, 216 S.E.2d 250 (1975).
155. Id. at 285, 216 S.E.2d at 253. The ordinance imposed the charge upon
wholesalers' deliveries of beer to retailers, declared its purpose to be regulatory, and
provided that the revenue produced would go entirely to county uses outside municipalities.
Id. at 283, 216 S.E.2d at 252.
156. Id. at 285, 216 S.E.2d at 253. The measure "was not a license fee or tax imposed
as a condition precedent to engaging in business." Id.
157. Id. at 287, 216 S.E.2d at 254.
158. 183 Ga. App. 486, 359 S.E.2d 184 (1987).
159. Id. at 487, 359 S.E.2d at 184. "While that is, indeed, a broad delegation of
legislative power, O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6 contains a limitation on Home Rule powers which
controls the resolution of this case . . . ." Id., 359 S.E.2d at 185.
160. Id. at 487, 359 S.E.2d at 185. "Appellant's apparent error is to equate a lack of
specific prohibition with authorization, i.e., to assume that because a particular form of
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The appellate courts have stood firm, therefore, on the "taxation"
exclusion of the home rule systems. Over time blatant efforts at raising
revenue, as well as more sophisticated formulations of "regulation," have
drawn judicial displeasure under the exclusionary focus.
c. Businesses Regulated by the Public Service Commission. Both
home rule systems exclude from their provinces of delegation the
expansion of "the power of regulation over any business activity
regulated by the Public Service Commission beyond that authorized by
charter [or local statutes] or general law or by the Constitution." 6 '
This express exclusion came into play in the fairly early case of City of
Doraville v. Southern Railway,62 a city's action to enjoin construction
within its limits of a railroad switching yard. 6 ' In assessing the
strength of plaintiff's claim, the supreme court emphasized two points:
the Public Service Commission had approved the expansion under state
law; 64 and municipal powers are strictly construed.' 65 In this case
the court observed that the municipality had been granted no power to
regulate the switching yard,'66 and the Home Rule Act expressly
excluded such power."'
On those 6 grounds the court sustained a
decision adverse to the municipality. 1

taxation is not prohibited, it is permitted. In light of the language of O.C.G.A. § 36-356(a)(3), we find that equation to be invalid." Id.
161. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a)(5) (1993 & Supp. 1998); GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para.
1(c)(5).
162. 227 Ga. 504, 181 S.E.2d 346 (1971).
163. Id. at 504, 181 S.E.2d at 346. Plaintiff municipality alleged that the switching
yard would be located in a highly populated and travelled portion of the city and that it
would create fire and traffic hazards. Id. at 504-05, 181 S.E.2d at 346-47.
164. Id. at 508, 181 S.E.2d at 348. In framing the issue for decision, the court stated
that "the Georgia Public Service Commission acting under the laws of this State, granted
to defendants, a common carrier by rail, authority to condemn specific property for the
necessary expansion of its facilities to serve the public ... ." Id.
165. Id. at 510, 181 S.E.2d at 350. "A municipality, being a creature of the State, has
only such direct power as is granted to it by the State and if there is a reasonable doubt
of the existence of a particular power, the doubt is to be resolved in the negative." Id. at
510-11, 181 S.E.2d at 350.
166. Id. at 510, 181 S.E.2d at 350. "The City of Doraville under its charter has not
been granted the power to regulate the construction or operation of a railroad switching
yard within its city limits, nor have we found any general law which grants to it such
authority." Id.
167. Id. at 511, 181 S.E.2d at 350. The court quoted the language of O.C.G.A. section
36-35-6(a)(5).
168. Id. at 513, 181 S.E.2d at 351.
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Crimes. Each home rule provision excludes from its local

government delegations any action defining state criminal offenses.169
In the early case of Richmond County v. Richmond County Business
Ass'n, 7 ° the supreme court pierced a county-designated "license fee"
to hold the measure a revenue-producing "tax."171 As such, the court
concluded, the exaction not only ran afoul of the home rule provision's
"taxation exclusion,"' 72 but the "crime exclusion" as well. 73 "The
attempt of the ordinance to make the failure to pay the so-called 'license
fee' punishable 'as for a misdemeanor,' is void and in violation of the
Home Rule Amendment of the Constitution ....
A decade later the court returned to the exclusion in the municipal
home rule context of Lambert v. City of Atlanta.175 The court deemed
the ordinance there in issue, a prohibition against solicitation for
prostitution or sodomy, precluded by the existence of general statutes. 7 6 "Additionally," the court asserted, "the ordinance must fall
because of the mandate of [the Home Rule Act] which limits the power
of municipalities to enact ordinances defining criminal offenses and
providing
for their punishment when the state has preempted the
" 17 1
field.

The home rule "crime exclusion" not only negatives authorization; it
also carries the positive thrust of invalidation.
e. Courts. Each home rule system excludes from its parameter of
local government delegation matters affecting courts. In framing the
exclusion, the municipal provision specifies "[aiction affecting the
jurisdiction of any court";178 the county provision specifies "[aiction

169. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(3); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a)(2).
170. 225 Ga. 568, 170 S.E.2d 246 (1969).
171. Id. at 571, 170 S.E.2d at 248. "However a tax for a license as a condition
precedent for engaging in the occupation is distinguished from other taxes, it is still a tax."

Id.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 141-60 for a discussion of this facet of the
decision.
173. 225 Ga. at 571, 170 S.E.2d at 248.
174. 225 Ga. at 569, 170 S.E.2d at 247. "The Home Rule Amendment ... clearly
prohibits action in the areas of criminal offenses or punishment and additional forms of
taxation." Id. at 571, 170 S.E.2d at 248.
175. 242 Ga. 645, 250 S.E.2d 456 (1978).
176. Id. at 647, 250 S.E.2d at 458. The court reversed defendant's conviction for
violation of the ordinance, holding the ordinance to violate "the uniformity clause of the
Constitution of Georgia." Id., 250 S.E.2d at 457-58.
177. Id., 250 S.E.2d at 458.
178. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a)(6) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
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affecting any court or the personnel thereof."' 79 The substantive
difference intended by those formulations, if any, is unclear. Moreover,
the case law is uninformative on the point-the decisions treat the
matter only in the county context.
Typically, the issue arises on complaint by a superior court clerk to
actions taken by the county governing authority. The court of appeals
confronted the matter in Price v. Fulton County Commission,5 ° a
clerk's challenge to the validity of a county contract authorizing a
private company to extract public records and make them available to
others for a fee. Relying upon the home rule exclusion, plaintiff charged
the county commissioners with an illegal "contractual invasion" of her
office. 18 1 Initially, the court registered conceptual difficulty with
plaintiff's position: it found no "ordinance, resolution, or regulation" as
contemplated by the home rule provision," 2 but "merely ...a contract
concerning county affairs."'
The contract "does not 'affect' the
manner in which the Clerk ...performs her duties"'8 4 and "[t]he clerk
will remain the official custodian of [county] records."'8 5 Although the
agreement contemplated the clerk's cooperation with the private
company, "such cooperation is no more than would be required of the
clerk toward any other member of the public seeking to utilize or
photocopy these records."18 Accordingly, the court held the contract
clear of the express "court" exclusion.'87
Several years later the issue presented itself to the supreme court in
the context of Stephenson v. Board of Commissioners of Cobb Coun-

179. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(7).
180. 170 Ga. App. 736, 318 S.E.2d 153 (1984).
181. Id. at 736, 318 S.E.2d at 154. "Appellant contends that the contract is an illegal
attempt to control the manner in which the Clerk of the [county] Superior Court performs
her duties." Id. at 736-37, 318 S.E.2d at 154.
182. Id. at 737, 318 S.E.2d at 155.
The "Home Rule" provisions concern the power of a county to adopt ordinances,
resolutions, or regulations relating to its property, affairs and local government
for which no provision has otherwise been made by general law. Subparagraph (c)
in turn prohibits a county from exercising the legislative powers granted to it so
as to affect any court or the personnel thereof.

Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. The court described the manner in which the clerk controlled and worked with
the county records. "The contract at issue in no way 'affects' these duties of the Clerk of
[the county] Superior Court, but contemplates that those duties shall continue to be
performed in exactly the same manner." Id. at 738, 318 S.E.2d at 155.
185. Id., 318 S.E.2d at 156.
186. Id., 318 S.E.2d at 155.
187. Id. at 739, 318 S.E.2d at 156.
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5
ty."'
There the court held the commissioners possessed exclusive
power to employ counsel for the superior court clerk." 9 To the clerk's
reliance upon the home rule "court" exclusion, the court reflected upon
the meaning of that exclusion. The exclusion might well preclude county
action that "negatively impacted on the ability of the ... court or the
personnel thereof to perform their jobs." 9 ° Even so, the employment
of counsel "does not by itself negatively impact on the ability of [the
clerk] or his personnel to carry out their duties."' 91 1This
analytical set92
off augured against the clerk's position in the case.
Finally, in Gwinnett County v. Yates, 9 ' the supreme court declared
an instance within the exclusion. The issue in Yates went to whether
the superior court clerk was subject to the county merit system, 94 an
issue the court resolved in the negative.' 95 As a primary component
of its analysis, the court relied upon the county home rule provision. 11
That provision's "court" exclusion, the court held, read in harmony with

188. 261 Ga. 399, 405 S.E.2d 488 (1991).
189. Id. at 400, 405 S.E.2d at 489. The clerk had employed an attorney to defend
against an inmate's action and later sought to mandamus the board of commissioners to
pay the attorney fees. The court held the clerk without power to hire counsel, and that the
board of commissioners possessed implicit power to employ counsel based upon its
legislative grant of authority to "control the fiscal affairs of the county." Id. at 401, 405
S.E.2d at 490.
190. Id. The court provided no examples of the type of negative impact envisioned.
191. Id. at 402, 405 S.E.2d at 490. The court also rejected the clerk's argument that
the board's attorney had a conflict of interests in the matter: "This argument fails because
[the clerk] did not demonstrate a conflict of interest that would have prohibited the
attorney employed by the board from representing him in the inmate's mandamus action."
Id.
192. Id. The court affirmed the trial judge's denial of the clerk's mandamus petition.
Id.
193. 265 Ga. 504, 458 S.E.2d 791 (1995).
194. Id. at 504, 458 S.E.2d at 792. The clerk had discharged a deputy clerk and then
maintained that the county merit board had no authority to consider the deputy's appeal.
When the attorney appointed by the county to represent the clerk refused to take that
position, the clerk employed his own attorney and prevailed on the issue in the trial court.
Id.
195. Id. The county obtained its merit system by local statute under a local
amendment to the constitution. The court held that later constitutional provisions (art. IX,
§ 1, para. 4) and general statutes (O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21) preserved the distinction between
county employees and employees of elected county officials. Id. at 505-07, 458 S.E.2d at
793-94.
196. Id. at 507, 458 S.E.2d at 794. "[Wle note that Art. IX, sec. 2, para. 1(c) of the
Georgia Constitution dealing with home rule for counties states that the power granted to
counties does not extend to ...(7) Action affecting any court or the personnel thereof." Id.
at 507-08, 458 S.E.2d at 794.
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general statutes,197 and dictated that the county merit board could
take no action affecting the clerk and his employees."' s
At this juncture, and only in the county context, the "court" exclusion
serves primarily to referee intragovernmental conflict between the
governing authority and the clerk of the superior court. Whether the
exclusion will similarly serve municipal government, in light of what
appears a more narrowly formulated "court" exclusion, remains
unsettled.

f. Private or Civil Relationships. The home rule provisions are
identical in their treatment of the "relationships" exclusion: "The power
granted... shall not include the power to take any action affecting the
private or civil law governing private or civil relationships, except as is
incident to the exercise of an independent governmental power."199
Although the Georgia Supreme Court has characterized this formulation
as "ambiguous," ° ° the exclusion has figured prominently in two major
controversies.
City of Atlanta v. McKinny2 °' featured municipal ordinances purporting to extend employee benefits to "domestic partners," and defining
"partners" as a "family relationship" comparable to that of "a
spouse."" 2 Reviewing a challenge to those ordinances, the court first
construed the "relationships" exclusion of the Home Rule Act: "At a
minimum, it means that cities in this state may not enact ordinances
defining family relationships."" 3 Although the Home Rule Act itself
specifically empowers cities to provide insurance benefits for employees'
"dependents,"" 4 it "does not define the term 'dependent."'2 °5 Rather,
197. I.e., O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
198. 265 Ga. at 508, 458 S.E.2d at 794. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's
decision on this issue but reversed the lower court's refusal to order the county to pay the
clerk's attorney fees. The court distinguished Stephenson in which the county had provided
counsel to assert the clerk's position. Id. at 508-09, 458 S.E.2d at 795.
199. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(d); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(b).
200. The court provided that characterization in the course of its opinion in City of
Atlanta v. McKinney, 265 Ga. 161, 164, 454 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1995). See infra notes 210-13
and accompanying text.
201. 265 Ga. 161, 454 S.E.2d 517 (1995).
202. Id. at 162, 454 S.E.2d at 519 (quoting ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCE 93-0-1057, § 3
(1993)). Other "ordinances ... prohibit[ed] discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, [and] establish[ed] a domestic partnership registry for jail visitation .. " The
court sustained the validity of these latter measures. Id.
203. Id. at 164, 454 S.E.2d at 520. "The Georgia General Assembly has provided for
the establishment of family relationships by general law." Id.
204. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-4(a) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
205. 265 Ga. at 164, 454 S.E.2d at 521. "The issue here is whether the city
impermissibly expanded the definition of dependent to include domestic partners." Id.
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general statutes define a dependent as "one who relies on another for
financial support,""' and, the court held, "domestic partners" did not
meet that definition. 20 7 Accordingly, "[w]e conclude that the city
exceeded its power to provide benefits to employees and their dependents
by recognizing domestic partners as 'a family relationship' and providing
employee20 8benefits to them 'in a comparable manner ...
spouse.'"

as for a

The second controversy followed the municipality's effort to correct its
previous error. The reformulated benefits ordinance litigated in City of
Atlanta v. Morgan °9 defined a "dependent" as one "who relies on
another for financial support."2 10 Additionally, the ordinance provided
211
tests for determining when a domestic partner "shall be dependent."
Those tests "clearly [do] not expand the State law definition of 'dependent, ' "2 12 the court asserted, and the ordinance had eliminated "any
language recognizing any new family relationship similar to marriage.
Accordingly, the ordinance "defines 'dependent' consistent
with State law and, therefore, ... it is not in violation of either the
Georgia Constitution or the Municipal Home Rule Act . . .214

Although judicially branded as ambiguous, the meaning eventually
established for the "relationships" exclusion will presumably be identical

206. Id. (citing an assortment of general statutes).
207. Id. at 164-65, 454 S.E.2d at 521. "Domestic partners do not meet any of these
statutory definitions of dependent." Id.
208. Id. at 165, 454 S.E.2d at 521. "Since it is beyond the city's authority to define
dependents inconsistent with state law, we affirm the trial court's ruling invalidating the
benefits ordinance as ultra vires under the home rule act and the Georgia Constitution."
Id.
209. 268 Ga. 586, 492 S.E.2d 193 (1997).
210. Id. at 587, 492 S.E.2d at 195. The court recounted that "[tihe issue in McKinney,
as in this appeal, was whether the City acted within its authority to provide benefits to its
employees and their dependents by defining 'dependent' consistent with State law." Id.,
492 S.E.2d at 194. The trial court had declared the second ordinance unconstitutional as
well. Id. at 586, 492 S.E.2d at 194.
211. Id. at 587-88, 492 S.E.2d at 195. The tests included whether the employee made
contributions of cash and supplies which the domestic partner relied upon for support, and
whether the contributions had existed for six months and were continuing. ATLANTA, GA.,
ORDINANCE 96-0-1018(a)(1)(B) (1996).
212. 268 Ga. at 589, 492 S.E.2d at 195. "It is within the City's discretion as a
governing authority to determine whether to provide such benefits to all, some, or none of
its employees' dependents." Id.
213. Id. at 588, 492 S.E.2d at 195. The court said that the municipality had thus
followed the court's holding in McKinney. Id.
214. Id. at 590, 492 S.E.2d at 196. A dissenting opinion for two justices argued that
the ordinance was in direct conflict with state law and thus beyond the city's authority
under the constitution or the Home Rule Act. Id. (Carley, J., dissenting).
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for cities and counties. Thus far the exclusion has provided only a
minimal barrier which the municipality hurdled with legislative alacrity.
There, it appeared, the substance of the home rule ordinance fell within
the authorization of the Home Rule Act; the ordinance must, however,
avoid expanding definitions appearing in state law. It required little
municipal effort simply to track the general statute's definition and
accomplish the municipality's original purpose. The "relationships"
exclusion, it appeared, required only an exercise in municipal draftsmanship.
g. Elective County Office. Unlike its municipal counterpart, the
county home rule provision enumerates an exclusion for "[a]ction
affecting any elective county office, the salaries thereof, or the personnel
thereof, except the personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the county
governing authority."215 Directed to relations between the governing
authority and other county officers and personnel, this exclusion claims
judicial attention with predictable regularity. It frequently serves as the
supreme court's legal buffer in delineating the respective strands of
county government administration.
The early controversy of Warren v. Walton2 1 appropriately illustrated both the context for and the application of the "elective office"
exclusion. Warren featured a sheriff's claim under a local statute
requiring county commissioners to supply police cars and to pay the
salaries of deputy sheriffs.2 17 In response the commissioners contended
the local statute conflicted with their authority under the county home
rule provision.218 In resolving the stand-off,2 9 the supreme court
immediately engaged the provision's exclusion for "any elective county
office." 220 Said the court: "The office of sheriff is elective," and "a
sheriff is a county officer."22' Accordingly, the local statute "is not in

215.

GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(1).

216. 231 Ga. 495, 202 S.E.2d 405 (1973).
217. Id. at 496, 202 S.E.2d at 406-07. The local statute, 1973 Ga. Laws 3237,
empowered the sheriff to appoint deputy sheriffs at specified salaries payable from county
funds and directed the commissioners to supply the sheriff with two radio-equipped
automobiles. Id.
218. Id., 202 S.E.2d at 407. The commissioners claimed the power to repeal the local
statute under their home rule authorizations. Id.
219. "The controlling issue in these two appeals is whether a local Act is unconstitutional because it is in violation of the Home Rule Amendment to the Georgia Constitution."
231 Ga. at 495, 202 S.E.2d at 406.
220. Id. at 499, 202 S.E.2d at 409. "In our view, the office of sheriff is specifically
exempt from Home Rule under [the home rule provision]." Id., 202 S.E.2d at 408.
221. Id., 202 S.E.2d at 409. "Moreover, deputy sheriffs are personnel of the sheriff as
contemplated by the ... constitutional provision." Id.
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violation of the Home Rule Amendment to the Georgia Constitution,"222
and the sheriff's personnel and equipment "are not subject to the
jurisdiction of the county governing authority.""
The court thus
affirmed the trial judge's mandamus against the commissioners.
On occasion, the conflict arises within the governing authority. In
Guhl v.Williams,224 it emerged between the chairman of the board of
commissioners and the commissioners themselves. Specifically, the
chairman challenged the commissioners' adoption of home rule ordinances repealing local statutes and increasing the commissioners' power over
county employees. 5 Essentially, the chairman contended, those
ordinances violated the "elective county office" exclusion for salaries and
personnel.226 Rejecting that contention, the court emphasized the
exclusion's exception for "personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the
county governing authority."227 "Employees of the county are 'personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the county governing authority,'" 22s
the court asserted, "and action affecting them in the form of a 'home rule
ordinance' is constitutionally permissible."22 9

222. Id. at 498, 202 S.E.2d at 408.
223. Id. at 500, 202 S.E.2d at 409. The court rejected the commissioners' argument
that they possessed specifically granted power to fix sheriff salaries: "The key language
in the constitutional provision relied upon ...is 'authorized to fix the salary, compensation
and expenses of those employed by such governing authority.'" Id. Finally,
[i]t
follows that the salary and expenses of the sheriff, the salaries of the deputies
and the radio-equipped automobiles for their use constitute 'action affecting [an]
elective county office, the salaries thereof, or the personnel thereof,' and that as
such they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the county governing authority.
Id.
224. 237 Ga. 586, 229 S.E.2d 382 (1976).
225. Id. at 587, 229 S.E.2d at 383-84. That power included the employment and
discharge of nonmerit system county employees. "The basic issue," the court reasoned,
"was one of law: whether the proposed Home Rule ordinances could repeal provisions of
the 1956 Local Act that had been enacted by the General Assembly." Id. at 587, 229 S.E.2d
at 383.
226. Id. I.e., "[A] 'home rule ordinance' cannot be passed 'affecting any elective county
office, the salaries thereof, or the personnel thereof, except the personnel subject to the
jurisdiction of the county governing authority.'" Id. at 587-88, 229 S.E.2d at 384 (quoting
GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(1)).
227. Id. at 588, 229 S.E.2d at 384.
228. Id.
229. Id. 'Therefore, the two ordinances ...could be enacted as proposed, and they
would supersede the specified provisions of the 1956 Local Act." Id.
The supreme court followed Guhl in a later case, Gray v. Dixon, 249 Ga. 159, 289 S.E.2d
237 (1982), sustaining the county commissioners' power to adopt a home rule ordinance
divesting the chairman -of the commissioners of power to hire, supervise, or discharge
personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the county governing authority. The court held this
ordinance "authorized by the County Home Rule Amendment as it concerns hiring and
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Contrarily, the exclusion does apply to employees of the county tax
commissioner. Mobley v.Polk County ° presented the salary claim of
a "deputy tag agent" who refused to comply with work regulations
adopted by county commissioners "for all employees paid from county
funds."2 31 Relying squarely upon the "elective office" exclusion, 232 the
court held the commissioners without home rule authority "to establish
2
work regulations for employees of another elected county officer." 11
Because the tag agent was an employee of the tax commissioner and the
commissioner constituted an "elective county office," the agent could
24
enforce the county commissioners' payment of her salary.
Even conceding the commissioners' actions may affect another county
official, they may not rise to the level of the "elective office" exclusion.
In Stephenson v. Board of Commissioners of Cobb County,235 the court
found the commissioners possessed exclusive authority to employ counsel
for the superior court clerk.2 36. Admittedly, therefore, the commissioners' exercise of that power affected another elective county official.
However, the court delineated, the "effect" was not of the type denied the
commissioners by the "elective office" exclusion. 23' First, the counsel
employed "is not a part of the clerk's staff";23 and second, employment

firing of'personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the county governing authority' and clearly
falls within the ambit of the exception to [the elective office exclusion]." Id. at 163, 289
S.E.2d at 241.
230. 242 Ga. 798, 251 S.E.2d 538 (1979).
231. Id. at 799, 251 S.E.2d at 540. Regulations included punching a time clock, a fortyhour work week, delivery of time cards to the payroll department, and limited vacation
periods. Plaintiff tag agent refused to comply with the regulations and sought mandamus
against the commissioners for payment of her salary. Id. at 798-99, 251 S.E.2d at 539-40.
232. "Powers of county commissioners are strictly limited by law, and they can do
nothing except under authority of law." Id. at 802, 251 S.E.2d at 541.
233. Id. This was true, "[n]o matter how desirable uniformity of work regulations of
various employees, of various county offices in the seat of government may be . . . ." Id.
234. Id. "Mandamus will lie to compel payment of a salary of an official who has
performed his duties and which salary has previously been approved for payment by the
proper fiscal authority where the only reason for non-payment is the non-compliance with
work regulations not authorized by law." Id. In contrast, the court held that under
general statutes the tax commissioner could be required to observe working hours
established by the county commissioners. Id. at 803-04, 251 S.E.2d at 542.
235. 261 Ga. 399, 405 S.E.2d 488 (1991).
236. Id. at 400, 405 S.E.2d at 489. The court first found the clerk to possess no such
authority; it then reasoned that "[b]ecause the board has the exclusive authority to control
the fiscal affairs of the county and has the power to defend county officers, we conclude the
board has the implicit power to employ counsel for county officers." Id. at 401, 405 S.E.2d
at 490.
237. Id. at 401, 405 S.E.2d at 490.
238. Id. The court said that "the board is not 'affecting' the clerk's office in [the
excluded] sense by employing counsel to represent the clerk, as the attorney is not part of
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of counsel did not "negatively impact" upon the clerk's ability to do his
job.2" 9 Accordingly, the court concluded, "[wie find no such impermissible 'effect' in the instant case."240
The clerk of superior court did prevail on the exclusion in the
somewhat different case of Gwinnett County v. Yates.24' There the
controversy turned upon whether the clerk was subject to the county
merit system, an issue the supreme court resolved in the negative.242
Under general statutes, the court explained, a county merit system does
not cover employees of elected county officials unless the official
requested coverage.243 Under the county home rule provision, the
court added, the powers granted to counties do not extend to actions
affecting elective county offices. 2 " Reading the general statutes and
the home rule exclusion "in harmony," the court held that "a county
merit board can take no action affecting the clerk of the superior court
and his employees unless, pursuant to [general statutes], the clerk" has
requested coverage.245
The supreme court thus continues, via the "county office" exclusion, to
resolve the differences inevitably arising between those who carry out
the administration of county government. Given the frequency of the
disagreements, as well as their intensity, the exclusion's "peace keeping"

the clerk's staff." Id.
239. Id. "The board's employment of counsel does not by itself negatively impact on the
ability of [the clerk] or his personnel to carry out their duties." Id. at 402, 405 S.E.2d at
490.
240. Id. at 402, 405 S.E.2d at 490. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
clerk's effort to mandamus the commissioners to pay attorney fees for counsel employed
by the clerk. Id. at 400, 405 S.E.2d at 489. The court thus rejected the clerk's contention
that the commissioners' selection of counsel violated the prohibition of the "elective county
office" exclusion in the county home rule provision. Id. at 402, 405 S.E.2d at 490.
241. 265 Ga. 504, 458 S.E.2d 791 (1995).
242. Id. at 504, 458 S.E.2d at 792. The case arose when the clerk discharged a deputy
clerk who appealed to the county merit board, and the attorney appointed by the
commissioners to represent the clerk refused to argue that the clerk was not subject to
merit system coverage. The clerk then employed his own counsel, prevailed in the lower
court on the issue, and sought to mandamus the commissioners to pay his attorney fees.
Id. at 504-05, 458 S.E.2d at 792.
243. Id. at 505-07, 458 S.E.2d at 793-94. The court relied upon O.C.G.A. section 36-121(b) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
244. Id. at 507-08, 458 S.E.2d at 794. The court relied upon GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2,
para. 1(c)(1).
245. 265 Ga. at 508, 458 S.E.2d at 794. The court reversed the trial court's refusal to
mandamus the commissioners to pay the clerk's attorney, distinguishing its prior decision
in Stephenson (discussed supra) in which the county did appoint counsel to assert the
clerk's legal position. Id. at 509, 458 S.E.2d at 795.
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function illumines an added dimension of the county home rule provision.
3. Preemption by General Statutes. Both home rule systems
couch their delegations of legislating power, in part, as follows: "The
governing authority of each municipal corporation [county] shall have
legislative power to adopt clearly reasonable ordinances, resolutions, or
regulations relating to its property, affairs, and local government for
which no provision has been made by general law ... ."24' Likewise,

each system expressly declares that "[tihe power granted to municipal
corporations [counties] ...shall not be construed to extend to... any
...matters which the General Assembly by general law has preempted
Each exercise of home rule power,
or may hereafter preempt ....",,247

therefore, stands subject to yet another potential of futility: can the
legislating venture withstand the threatening peril of preemption?
Although the supreme court's opinions reveal routine and passing
references to the threat, the court's decision in Commissioners of Wayne
County v. Smith 24 8 early instanced the potential's full fruition. There,
taxpayers sought to enjoin county commissioners from changing the
249
method of appointing members to the county hospital authority.
Defendants grounded their legislating efforts in "the 'home rule'
2 '
Resolving the controversy the
provisions of the Constitution.""
supreme court emphasized that present hospital authority appointments
were made "[plursuant to a general law."251 Moreover, the constitution's home rule provision "explicitly disallows any ...attempt by a local
governing authority to change or to interfere with the operation of
provisions of general law .... 252 That limitation, the court summari-

246. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(a); GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1 (a).
247. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a); GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c).
248. 240 Ga. 540, 242 S.E.2d 47 (1978).
249. Id. at 540, 242 S.E.2d at 47.
The obvious purpose of the ordinance and resolution... is to terminate abruptly
the appointment of new members in accordance with the general law ... ,
pursuant to which the board of the hospital authority has a voice in the selection
of its membership, and to substitute in lieu thereof a procedure that is similar to,
if not identical with, the procedure by which the membership of the authority
board was selected prior to enactment of [the general law]-that is, by decision of
the board of commissioners alone.
Id. at 541-42, 242 S.E.2d at 48.
250. Id. at 541, 242 S.E.2d at 48.
251. Id. at 540, 242 S.E.2d at 47.
252. Id. at 542, 242 S.E.2d at 48.
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ly concluded, foreclosed the county commissioners' efforts at legislating
new appointment procedures.2 53
4.
The System's First Legislating Delegation:
"Clearly
Reasonable Ordinances." As previously described, both home rule
systems confer two "legislating" powers upon local governments. The
distinction between the two grants, although appearing as one of degree,
goes to the heart of the home rule corpus. At the first tier, the
governing authority is empowered to adopt measures for its municipality
or county that do not rise to the level of affecting state legislation.
Second, the systems also authorize the governing body's adoption of
measures that amend or repeal charters or local statutes.254
As for the first delegation, the systems' grants are identically
formulated: "The governing authority of each municipal corporation
[county] shall have legislative power to adopt clearly reasonable
ordinances, resolutions, or regulations relating to its property, affairs,
and local government ... ."255 When controversy arises over the firsttier delegation, the governing authority is seeking to function within its
existing charter or local statutes and to utilize this additional grant of
power. On those "home rule" occasions, analytical attention rivets upon
specific facets of the first-tier formulation.
Judicial focus upon those facets found illustration in the case of
Jackson v. Gasses.256 There, county commissioners sought to relocate
the county jail facility to a former state prison. 7 In opposition,
plaintiff challenged the commissioners' power to move the jail outside
the limits of the county seat.5 8 Upon the trial court's agreement with
plaintiff,259 the supreme court surveyed the existing authority structure.261 In particular, the court emphasized the absence of jail-location

253. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's order enjoining the commissioners'
adoption of the proposed ordinance. Id.
254. See the discussion of the system's formulation, supra notes 44-60, 76-91.
255. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(a); GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(a).
256. 230 Ga. 712, 198 S.E.2d 657 (1973).

257. Id. at 712, 198 S.E.2d at 658. The commissioners alleged that the present jail was
in bad repair and unsafe, that renovation costs would be prohibitive, and that they had

access to the facilities at the former state prison camp for the sum of one dollar per year.
They alleged they were saving "hundreds of thousands of dollars of the taxpayers money."
Id.
258. Id. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief against the relocation of the jail facilities
beyond the limits of the municipality which served as the county site. He alleged that the
commissioners' action was "contrary to the Constitution and laws of this state." Id.
259. Id. The trial court enjoined the relocation. Id.
260. Id. at 713, 198 S.E.2d at 658-59.

134

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

restrictions from the local statute originally creating the county.261
Finding no existing prohibitions, 2 2 the court turned to the first-tier
home rule delegation: "[Wihat we regard as controlling is the Home
Rule Amendment of 1966... giv[ing] the governing authority the power
to adopt reasonable 'regulations relative to its property .... 2 The
court declared that delegation "broad enough to give the ...Commissioners discretion to locate administrative facilities and services,"226 54
and designated the jail relocation "authorized and reasonable action."
In terms of first-tier delegation facets, Jackson plumbed the particulars: The commissioners' actions "relat[ed] to its property"; those actions
effected the "clearly reasonable"; and they sufficed, consequently, as
"authorized" administration.
As formulated, the first-tier delegation is subservient to the existing
charter or local statutes. The supreme court confirmed that result two
years after Jackson in the somewhat similar setting of Brewster v.
Houston County.266
Brewster involved county commissioners who
2 67
maintained offices in a municipality other than the county seat.
Reviewing a challenge to that practice, the court immediately seized
upon the language of the local statute creating the county: "[P]ublic
business of said county shall be conducted at the public site."266 That
mandate overrode the home rule delegation and dictated the commissioners' conduct of their "official county business" at the county seat.2 9 As
for "administrative" actions, the court delineated, Jackson permitted
their "home rule" exercise outside the official site. °
The Georgia Court of Appeals paid passing reference to the first-tier
delegation in its disposition of City of Commerce v. Duncan & Godfrey,

261. Id., 198 S.E.2d at 659. The court cited 1827 Ga. Laws 65.
262. Id. "We have found no law or decision of this court and none has been called to
our attention, which restricts the Board of Commissioners ...in determining where the
jail should be located." Id., 198 S.E.2d at 658-59.
263. Id., 198 S.E.2d at 659.
264. Id. The court included such facilities as "jails, correctional camps, health clinics,
hospitals, public housing and the like." Id.
265. Id. at 714, 198 S.E.2d at 659. Two justices dissented.
266. 235 Ga. 68, 218 S.E.2d 748 (1975).
267. Id. at 68, 218 S.E.2d at 749. Plaintiffs were residents of the county seat; they
alleged that "during the last two years the commissioners have gradually moved the county
offices from [the county seat] to [the other municipality], and that only a token office is
maintained at the county site." Id.
268. Id. at 71, 218 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting 1823 Ga. Laws 172).
269. Id. The court reasoned that "official business" included "decision making process
of the board which includes deliberation and voting on any issue of county business." Id.
270. Id. at 70, 218 S.E.2d at 750.
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Inc.271 The case featured a municipal electric consumer's complaint
that the city failed to inform it of an alternative billing procedure that
would have significantly lowered plaintiff's rates.272 Rejecting the
municipality's defense under the home rule power to adopt clearly
reasonable measures,273 the court was adamant: "The city's authority
to establish rates for electrical service is not at issue here; rather, what
is at issue is the city's obligation to make available sufficient information
about those rates to enable its customers to take advantage of the
options available to them."274 A local government's authority to
perform a function, therefore, does not minimize legal obligations
reasonably arising from that function. That the authority may derive
from the home rule provision's first-tier delegation, moreover, does not
diffuse the obligation.
The court of appeals likewise holds the charter to dominate the
delegation. City of Buchanan v. Pope2 75 presented a police chief's
wrongful termination claim, based on dismissal provisions of a city police
manual.7 6 Defending, the municipality relied upon its nonrenewal
authority, contained in the municipal charter.2 77 Denominating the
documents "in direct conflict,"27 8 the court relied for resolution upon

the home rule provision: "[M]unicipal corporations have the power to
adopt only 'clearly reasonable"' measures "'which are not inconsistent
with ... any charter provision.'" 27' That first-tier formulation, the
court asserted, serves "to invalidate municipal ordinances inconsistent

271. 157 Ga. App. 337, 277 S.E.2d 266 (1981).
272. Id. at 338-39, 277 S.E.2d at 268. Plaintiff alleged that it complained of its rates
over a course of some three years during which period the city repeatedly checked the
accuracy of plaintiffs meter, but never informed plaintiff of an alternative meter for large
consumers. When plaintiff finally became aware of the alternative meter, its bills dropped
significantly. Plaintiffs expert testified to a loss of some ten thousand dollars by virtue of
plaintiffs ignorance of the alternative billing methods. Id.
273. Id. at 340, 277 S.E.2d at 269. "Similarly inapplicable is [the home rule provision]."
Id.
274. Id., 277 S.E.2d at 270. The court thus affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff. Id. at 341, 277 S.E.2d at 270.
275. 222 Ga. App. 716, 476 S.E.2d 53 (1996).
276. Id. at 716, 476 S.E.2d at 54. Plaintiff "claims a right of continuing employment
constituting a property interest under the terms of the police department 'policies and
procedures' manual" allegedly adopted by the municipality. Id.
277. Id. The charter authorized the council to employ police officers "'who shall be
elected for such term not exceeding twelve months as the council may see fit.'" Id., 476
S.E.2d at 55 (quoting 1908 Ga. Laws 475).
278. Id. at 718, 476 S.E.2d at 56. "The issue of whether the City's charter or the
personnel manual controls [plaintiffs] employment is also a question of law." Id. at 717,
476 S.E.2d at 55.
279. Id. at 718, 476 S.E.2d at 56, (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(a)).
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with a city's charter. 28 ° The formulation operates, therefore, to
condemn as well as to condone.
5. The System's Second Legislating Delegation: Changing
State Laws. The second-tier delegation constitutes the system's most
extensive grant of local "legislating" power; it comprises, no less, the
essence of Georgia's home rule complex. The formulations themselves
assume slightly different structures. The Municipal Home Rule Act
effects the authorization as follows: "[A] municipal corporation may, as
an incident of its home rule power, amend its charter by following either
of the following procedures."2 81 The county constitutional provision
declares that "a county may, as an incident of its home rule power,
amend or repeal the local acts applicable to its governing authority by
following either of the procedures hereinafter set forth."" 2
Under these delegations, therefore, local governments are empowered
to change existing state law. The change envisioned for municipalities
is that of amending the municipal charter. For counties, the anticipated
modifications are amendments or repeals of local statutes "applicable to
[the] governing authority."28 3 Whatever the substantive distinctions
intended, if any, the change must take one of two specified approaches.
The approaches are generally the same for municipalities and counties.
Under the first elaborated procedure, the local governing authority
makes the change; under the second procedure, the change is effected by
the people of the local government. Those procedures, their content and
compliance with them, prove pivotal to the Georgia home rule system's
second-tier delegation.
a. Changes Effected by the GoverningAuthority. The first procedure,
that by which the governing authority changes local statutes, prescribes
that the change be effected by an ordinance adopted at two regular
consecutive meetings,2" 4 following publication of a specified notice.285

280. Id. The court ordered summary judgment for the municipality. Id. at 722, 476
S.E.2d at 58.
281. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
282. GA. CONST. art. IX,§ 2, para. 1(b).
283. Id.
284. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(1); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(1). The county
provision specifies that the change be made by an ordinance or resolution. Both systems
require that the consecutive meetings be held not less than seven nor more than sixty days
apart. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para 1(b)(1); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(1).
285. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(1); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(1). The notice is
published in the county legal organ once a week for three weeks during sixty days
immediately preceding final adoption of the ordinance. The notice must contain a synopsis
of the proposed ordinance and state that a copy is available for public inspection. The clerk

1998]

GEORGIA HOME RULE SYSTEM

286
After adoption, a copy of the ordinance (and supporting information)
must be filed with the Secretary of State and (for municipal ordinances)
with the appropriate clerk of the superior court. 287 The Secretary
of
288
State must publish and distribute these ordinances annually.
Preliminarily, the obvious but crucial distinction between the
legislating delegations bears reemphasis. First-tier delegations are
subservient to local statutes.
Second-tier delegations (by either
procedure) are employed to change local statutes. As fundamental as
this distinction may be to the home rule system, the ease with which it
can be blurred is illustrated by the supreme court's disposition of Forbes
v. Lovett.2 "9 The result in Forbes is unremarkable: the court sustained
the validity of a county ordinance which, repealing a prior local statute,
established a new civil service system. 2" The court's opinion, however,
is unhelpful: it first set out the county home rule provision's first-tier
authority for the governing body "to adopt legislation 'relating to its
property, affairs and local government.' 291 It was "[plursuant to the
above section," the court asserted, that the county "passed the 1971
ordinance specifically repealing the 1956 local Act."292 If, however, the
ordinance repealed the statute, that action could be sustained only under
the second-tier delegation, 293 a provision completely omitted from the
court's opinion. The case, in any event, stands as a caution against
confusing the delegations.
As observed, several administrative requirements condition the
governing authority's power to change local statutes. Both county and
municipal governing authorities must file the ordinance with the
Secretary of State. Additionally, the municipality must file its ordinance

of the superior court must furnish a copy of the proposed ordinance in response to a written

request. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para 1(b)(1); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(1).
286. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(g); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-5. The supporting information
is a copy of the required notice and an affidavit of a newspaper representative stated that
the notice was properly published. GA. CONST. art. IX,§ 2, para 1(a); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-5.
287. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para 1(a); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-5.
288. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para 1(a); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-5. Changes made by the
governing authority may not amend or repeal changes made by the people, or local statutes
approved in a referendum, unless twelve months have elapsed. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2
para. 1(b)(1); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(1).
289. 227 Ga. 772, 183 S.E.2d 371 (1971).
290. Id. at 744, 183 S.E.2d 373. Accordingly, the court held the appointment of
plaintiffs to the civil service board, accomplished under the local statute, ineffective. Id.
291. Id., 183 S.E.2d at 373 (quoting GA. CONST.art. IX, § 2, para. 1(a)).
292. 227 Ga. at 775, 183 S.E.2d at 373. "As a result of the adoption of this ordinance
a new Civil Service System was created and established in [the] County providing the
procedures for the appointment of a Civil Service Board in accordance with its terms." Id.
293. Le., GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(1).
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with "the clerk of the superior court of the county of the legal situs of the
municipal corporation." 294 The effect of a failure to meet this latter

requirement arose as the issue for decision in Jackson v. FraternalOrder
of Police.295 Assessing the legal significance of the filing omission, the
supreme court first emphasized the procedural steps which the
municipality actually took.2 These included proper advance advertisement, regular enactment, and subsequent deposit with the Secretary
of State. "In these circumstances," the court reasoned, the municipality
had substantially complied with "the legal requirements necessary to
effect a charter change under the ... Home Rule Act."297 The court

declared itself "unwilling" to29invalidate the ordinance after "many
months of operation" under it.

8

As previously described, the system's second-tier formulations differ
slightly in several respects. The municipal authorization applies to the
amendment of the municipal "charter"; 99 the county authorization
includes the amendment or repeal of "local acts." °° The former
authorization's reference to the "charter," moreover, is unrestricted. The
county authorization's reference to "local acts," however, specifies "local
acts applicable to its governing authority."30 ' This latter variation, it
turns out, constitutes a distinction with a difference.
Wood v. Gwinnett County °2 featured a county resolution purporting
to amend a local statute that created the "County Public Facilities
Authority."303 The litigation's "single issue" pivoted upon whether the
county home rule provision authorized the amendment.0 4 The supreme court's analysis first emphasized the formulation's limitation:

294. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-5 (1992 & Supp. 1998).
295. 234 Ga. 906, 218 S.E.2d 633 (1975). The case involved the status of municipal
employees as determined by an ordinance of the city governing authority. The court held
the ordinance to constitute a charter amendment and thus found it subject to the
requirements of the municipal home rule statute. Id. at 913, 218 S.E.2d at 638.
296. Id. at 912-13, 218 S.E.2d at 637-38. The court observed that the 'new city
government complied with all legal requirements except one. That one exception was the
failure to file the duly enacted ordinance with the clerk of superior court as required by
[the home rule statute]." 234 Ga. at 912, 218 S.E.2d at 637.
297. Id. at 913, 218 S.E.2d at 638.
298. Id.
299. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
300.

GA. CONST.-art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b).

301. Id.
302. 243 Ga. 833, 257 S.E.2d 258 (1979).
303. Id. at 833, 257 S.E.2d at 258. The local statute had been enacted four years
earlier. 1975 Ga. Laws 4463.
304. 'This appeal presents the single issue whether [the] County under its home rule
power has authority to amend a local Act of the legislature creating the ...County Public
Facilities Authority." 243 Ga. at 833, 257 S.E.2d at 258.

1998]

GEORGIA HOME RULE SYSTEM

"[T]he county is empowered to 'amend or repeal the local acts applicable
to its governing authority' only, and not other local Acts."" 5 A "strict
construction" of that delegation mandated inquiry into the nature of the
county "Public Facilities Authority."3 6
That entity, the inquiry
revealed, was not "a mere creature or arm of the county governing
authority,"30 7 but rather "a public corporation" and a "political subdivision of the State of Georgia."0 8 Separate from the county governing
authority "in membership, powers, and duties,"0 9 the entity lacked
power to create a county obligation.3 1
Accordingly, the local act
creating the public facilities authority was not a local act applicable to
the county's governing authority.3 11 Consequently, the court declared
the measure
exempt from amendment under the county's home rule
3 12
power.

b. Changes Effected by Citizen Initiative. The second home rule
procedure for changing state laws originates with a petition from the
local government's "electors." 13 As previously described, a specified
percentage of the local voters must file the petition with the governing
authority (municipality) or probate judge (county).3 14 The petition
must state the "exact language" of the proposed measure, and the
recipient determines its validity.3 5 Following prescribed publication
of notice, the election is held and the proposed amendment or repeal
carries if approved by more than one-half of the votes cast.31 6 Before
it becomes effective, the measure must first be filed with the Secretary
of State and (for municipalities) with the clerk of superior court.1 7 In

305. Id. at 834, 257 S.E.2d at 259. The court emphasized that "[tihe governing
authority, of course, is the county commission." Id.
306. Id. "Counties are creatures whose limited powers must be strictly construed." Id.

307. Id.
308. Id. The authority was "not an arm of the county which could be controlled by the
commissioners." Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. The court noted that the original local statute had created the public facilities
authority to build and finance fire stations, and that the amendment in issue "would add
numerous other types of buildings and facilities," and "authorize the use of other funds for
certain structures." Id. at 833, 257 S.E.2d at 258.
311. Id. at 834-35, 257 S.E.2d at 259. "[Tlhe Authority is not an extension of the
county .... " Id.
312. The court reversed the trial court's decision upholding the amendment. Id.
313. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(2); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(2) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
314. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(2).
315. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(2).
316. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(2).
317. O.C.G.A. § 36-35-5.
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this fashion, therefore, changes to charter and local statutes may occur
without adoption by the governing authority.
The supreme court provided a general analysis of the initiative
procedure in the 1983 case of Sadler v. Nijem, 31 s an action to mandamus the municipal governing authority to call an election upon a
proposed charter amendment.319 The governing authority contended
that the proposed amendment, requiring a full-time compensated fire
department,32 ° would conflict with general statutes and the constitution. In its review of the issues, the court first rejected defendants'
reliance upon Amendment 19 to the constitution. 321 Although that
amendment authorized municipalities to provide fire protection, 322 it

did not prevent municipal voters from agreeing by petition and
referendum to accept and implement that authority.323 Second, the
court likewise disputed defendants' position that a 1962 general statute
vested fire department maintenance in the municipal "governing
body."3 24 This grant of power ran simply to the municipality, the court
reasoned, and did not exclude governing authorities from deciding how
the power is to be exercised.3 21 "[Nior does it prohibit the citizens of

318. 251 Ga. 375, 306 S.E.2d 257 (1983).
319. Id. at 376, 306 S.E.2d at 258. The plaintiff, a registered municipal voter had
presented the petition, signed by a percentage of city voters, to municipal officials; the
petition specified the language of the proposed charter amendment; the city officials had
responded with a notice that the proposed amendment would conflict with existing general
statutes and the constitution; the plaintiff sought mandamus to compel defendants to call
an election on the petition. Id.
320. Id. The proposed charter amendment provided that "the City... shall continue
to provide and maintain professional firefighting and prevention services, through the
City's Municipal Fire Department, which shall be composed of full-time paid personnel who
are and shall be employees of the City." Id.
321. Id. at 377, 306 S.E.2d at 259.
322. Id. "The use of the word 'may' means that the powers and services are permissible
rather than mandatory." Id.
323. Id. "Amendment 19 was a grant of authority from the General Assembly to
municipalities (and counties) and the proposed charter amendment merely accepts such
grant of authority ... Amendment 19 does not prevent municipal governing authorities
from agreeing to provide fire protection nor does it prevent municipal voters from so
agreeing by petition and referendum." Id.
324. Id. at 378, 306 S.E.2d at 260. "In addition to the other powers which it may have,
the governing body of any municipal corporation shall have the following powers, under
this chapter, relating to the administration of municipal government:. . . ." O.C.G.A. § 3635-2 (1993 & Supp. 1998). The municipality argued that "a charter provision requiring it
to maintain a municipal fire department would contravene this section by taking these
powers away from the 'governing body,' here the mayor and council." 251 Ga. at 378, 306
S.E.2d at 260.
325. Id. "That act was intended to allow municipalities to exercise certain powers
themselves.... not to define the means by which the cities would and could manage their
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a municipality from choosing, by charter amendment based upon petition
and referendum, how such powers shall be exercised." 326 Accordingly,
the court held the home rule initiative procedure applicable327 and
declared the plaintiff entitled to an election upon the proposed charter
amendment.328
With the supreme court's decision in Sadler, therefore, the initiative
procedure's validity and general sphere of operation appeared well
settled. More recently, litigation has confronted the court with confusing
details of the procedure's legislative structure.
The ambiguity arose from the Municipal Home Rule Act's pivotal twotier delegation provision.329 Subsection (a) of that provision empowers
the governing authority to adopt "ordinances, resolutions, or regulations
relating to its property, affairs and local government."33 ° Subsection
(b) takes up the separate matter of how the municipality, via either of
two procedures, may "amend its charter."33'
In elaborating the
initiative procedure, however, the language refers both to "amendments
to charters,"3 32 and to "amendments to or repeals of ordinances, resolutions, or regulations adopted pursuant to subsection (a)."333 Does this
latter reference empower voters to change by initiative and referendum
those noncharter "ordinances, resolutions, or regulations" that the
governing authority adopts under subsection (a)?334

affairs." Id.
326. Id. "In short, the 1962 act was intended to delegate power, not to regulate its
exercise." Id.
327. Id. "The rights of the 'governing body' to choose how the powers of the City shall
be exercised should not exceed the rights of the voters to so choose." Id. The 1962 general
statute "does not proscribe the proposed charter amendment." Id.
328. Id. at 378-79, 306 S.E.2d at 260. The court thus reversed the trial judge's refusal
to issue the mandamus. Id.
329. Id. § 36-35-3(a)(b).
330. Id. § 36-35-3(a).
331. Id. § 36-35-3(b): "[A] municipal corporation may, as an incident of its home rule
power, amend its charter by following either of the following procedures: § 36-35-3(b)(1),
(b)(2)(A)."
332. Id. § 36-35-3(b)(2)(A).
333. Id. § 36-35-3(b)(2)(A): "Amendments to charters or amendments to or repeals of
ordinances, resolutions, or regulations adopted pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code
section may be initiated by a petition, filed with the governing authority of the municipal
corporation .... "
334. The county home rule constitutional provision appears to contain the same
ambiguity. In elaborating the initiative procedure, that provision also refers to "[a]mendments to or repeals of... local acts or ordinances, resolutions, or regulations adopted
pursuant to subparagraph (a) hereof...."
GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(2).
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Kemp v. City of Claxton 35 originated with the municipal governing
authority's adoption of resolutions closing two railroad grade crossings
in the city.336 Residents and owners of businesses sought to file
petitions to repeal those resolutions by referendum. 3 7 The municipal
clerk refused to accept the petitions on the ground that the resolutions
effected no charter changes. The initiative procedure, the municipality
Upon
maintained, applied only to changes affecting the city charter.
trial the superior court granted a mandamus requiring the clerk to
accept and approve the petitions.3 9
The supreme court initiated its analysis by delineating between the
Act's "spirit and intent" and its "literal language."3 4 ' As for intent, the
Home Rule Act's "primary purpose" was "to authorize municipalities to
amend their charters by their own actions." 4 ' As for language, the
court emphasized the initiative delegation's reference to charter
amendments over its inclusion of ordinances, resolutions, and regulations.342 "This also shows that the petition and referendum provision
is intended to be available only when the proposed amendment is
intended to affect a city charter."343 Finally, the court observed that
subsection (a) granted the power to adopt ordinances, resolutions, and
The requisite "strict
regulations to "the governing authority."3 "
construction" of that delegation precluded the electorate from exercising
the "general legislative power" of "petition[ing] for a referendum on all

335. 269 Ga. 173, 496 S.E.2d 712 (1998).
336. Id. at 173, 496 S.E.2d at 713-14. The resolution noted that the crossings
.presented an unreasonable danger to the public and resolved to close.those two crossings
in the interest of public safety." Id. at 173, 496 S.E.2d at 714.
337. Id. Plaintiffs claimed "that closing the crossings will reduce customer access to
various businesses by disrupting traffic flow on [the involved streets]." Id.
338. Id. They argued that the initiative provision "authorizes a referendum only if it
affects the city charter, and because the resolutions enacted by the mayor and council did
not affect the city charter, no petition for referendum could lie." Id.
339. Id. at 174, 496 S.E.2d at 714.
340. Id. at 175, 496 S.E.2d at 715. The court said that "a statute is to be read as a
whole, and the spirit and intent of the legislation prevails over a literal reading of the
language." Id. at 175-76, 496 S.E.2d at 715.
341. Id. at 175, 496 S.E.2d at 715. "The two procedures of OCGA § 36-35-3(b) were
enacted to relieve the General Assembly of its earlier burden of separately amending each
and every city charter in the state." Id.
342. Id. at 176, 496 S.E.2d at 715. "The legislative intent will be effectuated even if
some language must be eliminated." Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. "O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(a) (1993 & Supp. 1998) specifies that the delegation of
legislative power is to 'the governing authority,' which is the Mayor and Council." Id., 496
S.E.2d at 716.
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ordinances and resolutions."34 5 In sum, "[tihe petition procedure of
[the initiative delegation] applies only to amendments to municipal
charters."34 Because the municipality's street-closing resolutions did not
constitute charter amendments, the court held, plaintiffs possessed no
right to a repeal referendum.34 7

B. Amendment 19 in the Courts
The Georgia Supreme Court has also confronted several issues arising
under the constitution's 1972 "supplementary powers" provision." As
previously described,3 49 this provision expansively authorizes local
governments to exercise a large number of enumerated "powers" and
"services."350
Concomitantly, the provision expressly restricts the
General Assembly's power to act upon the listed subjects: it may do so
only by general statute. 5 1 Moreover, although such general statutes
may "regulate, restrict, or limit" the exercise of granted powers, the
statutes may not "withdraw" the powers from the local government. 2
Although Amendment 19 is not technically a component of Georgia's
home rule system, its evolving litigation should be noted in passing.
345. Id. "As we must strictly construe the grant of legislative power to the governing
authority, we must reject plaintiffs' argument that the electorate can directly exercise such
general legislative power." Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. "Consequently, the superior court erred in granting mandamus and requiring
that the City Clerk accept and approve the petitions at issue." Id.
348. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 3.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
350. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 3(a). These are set forth in some fourteen broadly
couched enumerations.
351. GA. CONST. art. X, § 2, para. 3(d).
352. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 3(c). The distinction between regulating, restricting,
or limiting on the one hand, and withdrawing on the other, did not appear in Amendment
19's original version, but was foreshadowed in City of Atlanta v. Myers, 240 Ga. 261, 240
S.E.2d 60 (1977). There a municipality employed the provision's power over police and fire
protection to enact an ordinance requiring that police and fire officers be municipal
residents. Under Amendment 19, the city argued its ordinance to prevail in the face of a
general statute prohibiting local governments from requiring officers and employees to be
city residents. Holding the ordinance to bow to the general statute, the supreme court
reasoned as follows:
There is no indication in the 1972 amendment to the 1945 Constitution ... that
the grant of powers to counties and municipalities to provide certain services, and
to enact ordinances to effectuate the powers given, was intended to preclude the
General Assembly from enacting general laws affecting the manner in which the
powers would be exercised.
Id. at 264, 240 S.E.2d at 63. Thereafter, the general-statute distinction made its way into
Amendment 19. For brief treatment of Myers see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government
"Home Rule": A Place to Stop?, 12 GA. L. REV. 905 (1978).
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The supreme court has elaborated the provision's purpose as follows:
This paragraph of the constitution is designed to supplement the
powers specifically conferred by local law upon each municipality and
county in order to make such powers uniform and to reduce the need
for special legislation to enable these entities to act, independently or
together, in their own best interests.3 53
In the spirit of these envisioned aspirations, the court has employed the
provision across a substantive spectrum of local government settings.
The exercise found early illustration in a controversy over county power
to design and draft plans for constructing a fire station. 5 4 Denoting
a challenge to the endeavor "clearly without merit,"3 55 the court
356
hoisted Amendment 19's authorization "to provide fire protection."
The county thus possessed power "to do whatever [is] necessary to carry
out this goal,"357 the court asserted, and although "not in the architecture business," the county "may use its own employees to provide the
engineering services needed to accomplish its purposes."358
The court subsequently drew power from the provision in the
strikingly diverse settings of sanitary landfills and privatization of
The former controversy encompassed a
governmental services.
municipality's challenge to charges for use of the county landfill, charges
that the city had paid for a period of two years.3 59 Rejecting that
challenge, the court reflected that under Amendment 19, a county "may
provide services for garbage collection and disposal ...; may enact
ordinances and contract with cities to provide such service; and

353. Coweta County v. City of Newnan, 253 Ga. 457, 459, 320 S.E.2d 747, 749-50
(1984).
354. Georgia Ass'n of the American Inst. of Architects v. Gwinnett County, 238 Ga. 277,
233 S.E.2d 142 (1977). Here the architectural association contested the design and
supervision of the building of a fire station by a professional engineer employee of the
county. The supreme court concluded that the county and its employees had not
unlawfully practiced architecture. Id. at 277, 233 S.E.2d at 142.
355. "The second contention by the architects that [the] County does not have the
constitutional power to design or draft plans and specifications or to erect a fire station is
clearly without merit." Id. at 280, 233 S.E.2d at 144.
356. Id. "The Georgia Constitution enables the counties to provide fire protection." Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's rejection of the architect association's
challenge. Id.
359. City of Covington v. Newton County, 243 Ga. 476, 254 S.E.2d 855 (1979). The
municipality dumped its garbage in the county landfill, and "[t]he rates charged were set
out in a county ordinance establishing fees for commercial haulers which included all
municipalities who choose to use the county's landfill rather than maintain their own." Id.
at 476, 254 S.E.2d at 856.
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determine and fix reasonable charges and fees for' the service."360
Finding an "implied contract" between the parties,"' the court deemed
both the county's landfill and its fee schedule constitutionally authorized."6 2
The privatization face-off featured an agreement by county commissioners to "employ a private corporation to procure, manage, supervise
and direct the personnel in the fire protection delivery service. " "
Appraising an attack upon the agreement by taxpayers and employees
of the county fire department,3 ' the court immediately engaged
Amendment 19.365 That provision's enumeration of the "fire protection" service "clearly authorizes a county to decide to provide its citizens
"
with fire protection services, and then to implement that decision. 366
"In particular," the court reasoned, "counties are authorized to enter
contracts to provide fire protection, even though that particular
contractual power is not expressly conferred."167 The court adamantly
refused to second guess the agreement's appropriateness: "The discretion
to choose among
lawful means is given by law to the Commissioners, not
3
to the court." 68
Amendment 19's exceptions may feature as prominently as its
authorizations. For example, the provision declares that "[u]nless

360.

Id.

361. Id.
362.

Id. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment for the county. Id.

363.

Smith v. Board of Comm'rs of Hall County, 244 Ga. 133, 134, 259 S.E.2d 74, 75

(1979). The commissioners adopted a resolution terminating the county funding of the
county fire department and subsequently entered into a contract for the service with a
private corporation. Id. at 733-34, 259 S.E.2d at 75.
364. Id. at 134, 259 S.E.2d at 75. "Plaintiffs challenge the contract for various reasons
as being beyond the Commissioners' authority, the principal reason proffered being that
the Commissioners lack authority to cease funding and effectively dissolve the current Fire

Department and lack authority to replace it with a private corporation." Id.
365. Id. at 137, 259 S.E.2d at 77.
The Constitution of Georgia ...provides in pertinent part that "inaddition to and
supplementary of any powers now conferred upon and possessed by any county,
municipality, or any combination thereof, any county, any municipality and any
combination of any such political subdivisions may exercise the following powers
and provide the following services: (1) ...fire protection . .

.

Id.
366. Id. at 138, 259 S.E.2d at 77. "Inimplementing that decision, counties are
'authorized to do whatever [is] necessary to carry out this goal.'" Id. (quoting Georgia
Ass'n of the American Inst. of Architects v. Gwinnett County, 238 Ga. 277, 280, 233 S.E.2d
142 (1977)).
367. Id.
368. Id., 259 S.E.2d at 78. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment upholding the
validity of the county contract. Id. at 144, 259 S.E.2d at 81.
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otherwise provided by law," a local government may not exercise or
provide the authorized "powers and services" inside the boundaries of
another government except by contract with that government.36 9 On
occasion, therefore, the contract requirement looms large in Amendment
19 litigation. On one occasion, for instance, a county urged the
requirement to prevent the city's expansion of water service into the
county.37 °
Reviewing the city's demand for county right-of-way
permits, the supreme court noted a local statute empowering the city's
extraterritorial distribution of water.37 ' That local statute "is a 'law'
within the meaning of [Amendment 19's] phrase 'unless otherwise
provided by law."'" 2 Indeed that phrase "allows for individual variations among [local governments] which have already been provided by
law."373 In this case, the court held, the prior-existing "law" trumped
Amendment 19's contract requirement 374 and entitled the municipality
to county right-of-way permits.37
The court employed the same rationale in appraising a landowner
protest to municipal condemnation of property for purposes of sewer
expansion.37 The landowners relied squarely upon Amendment 19's
contract requirement. 77 Absent a contract between the two governments, they argued, the municipality lacked power to extend its
operations into the county. Again, the court's first analytical focus
fastened upon a local statute authorizing municipal condemnation "in or

369. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 3(b)(1)(2).
370. Coweta County v. City of Newnan, 253 Ga. 457, 320 S.E.2d 747 (1984). Upon
request of citizens in the unincorporated area of the county, the municipality sought rightof-way permits from the county for locating its water lines. The county denied the city's
request "because there was no contract between the city commission and the county
concerning supplying these services in the county .... ." Id. at 458, 320 S.E.2d at 749.

Subsequently, the municipality petitioned for mandamus. Id.
371. 1973 Ga. Laws 3690. "The 1973 Act clearly empowers the city commission to
extend its services beyond the city limits." 253 Ga. at 458, 320 S.E.2d at 749.
372. Id. at 459, 320 S.E.2d at 750.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 459-60, 320 S.E.2d at 750. "Thus, there is no merit to the county's
contention that the constitution requires a contract between [the] County and the city
commission in order for the commission to supply water in the county because here such
authority is provided by law." Id.
375. Id. at 461, 320 S.E.2d at 751. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of
a mandamus absolute against the county. Id.
376. Kelley v. City of Griffin, 257 Ga. 407, 359 S.E.2d 644 (1987). Plaintiffs argued
"that since their land lies beyond the city limits of [the municipality], the city may not
condemn absent a written agreement with the county to provide for such services." Id. at
407, 359 S.E.2d at 645. 377. Id. "In arguing that the city cannot condemn land outside the city limits, the
landowners rely on [Amendment 19]." Id.
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out of said city."'7 8 Under the "Amendment relied upon by the landowners," the court reasoned, "the power to condemn outside the city
limits is. . 'otherwise provided3 by
law' and a contract between the city
79
required."
not
is
county
the
and
C.

In Summary

For slightly more than three decades, the Georgia Supreme Court has
labored at evolving the state's home rule system, translating the nuances
of legislative exposition into the practicalities of local government
administration. Familiarity with this litigational corpus is essential,
therefore, to an adequate understanding of the system itself.
A review of the corpus yields preliminary surprise over a case volume
somewhat smaller than logically expected. In a jurisdiction traditionally
committed to "legislative supremacy," any proposal savoring of local
autonomy typically encountered historic and unrelenting resistance.
When, in strikingly modern times, the home rule system did eventually
emerge, its supporters were surely entitled to anticipate a veritable
hailstorm of legal antagonism. Overall, however, the reactionary
foundational challenges never materialized.
Some of the earliest cases arising from the system's specific grants of
authority prompted legislative perfections of the system itself. These
initial episodes evidenced an adjustment period during which existing
local government law accommodated the system's induction.
The bulk of the litigation has emanated from the system's express
exclusions, as in each instance the court assigns asserted powers either
within or without the home rule preserve. Necessarily, these controversies rivet judicial focus to details of legislative terminology, with little or
no consideration paid to overarching doctrine. Thus, the occasions are
fairly unhelpful for formulating basic evaluational impressions.
The system's two-tiered delegation structure captures the essence of
Georgia's home rule creation. Authorizing the local government to
legislate at dual but distinctive levels, the structure's dichotomy
dominates analytical appraisal. The foundational distinction turns upon
legislating within existing state law and legislating to change existing
state law. In reviewing efforts at the first level, the court pays
cognizance to such controlling statutory standards as "clearly reasonable," and "relating to property or affairs." The court is also clear that
first-tier legislating ranks subservient to local statutes.

378. Id. at 408, 359 S.E.2d at 645.
379. Id. The court affirmed the trial court's refusal to set aside the condemnation. Id.
at 409, 359 S.E.2d at 646.
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The second-tier delegation represents the Georgia system's most potent
projection of local autonomy. It is under this delegation, tailored
respectively to cities and counties, that the local government actually
changes statutes previously enacted by the General Assembly. The
changes may come through two elaborated procedures, the first vested
in the local governing authority. In dealing with this procedure, the
court has manifested a degree of maneuverability on clerical requirements but none on substantive applicability.
The other second-tier procedure vests the power of initiative and
referendum in the voters of the locality. Under this procedure, when
exercised as intended, the voters may mandamus legislative change over
the opposition of the governing authority itself. Whether the procedure
is exercised as intended depends upon the court's perception of
legislative spirit and purpose, rather than literal statutory language.
Accordingly, at least three impressions arise from observing Georgia's
home rule system in litigation. First, the system's modern advent has
precipitated no change in Georgia's ancient law on local government
power. Thus, the precept holds firm that Georgia local governments
possess only expressly granted and clearly implied powers. Although
home rule may provide an additional source for the judicial power
search, the search itself remains restricted to express or implied
authority. Consequently, the system affords no basis for an assertion of
inherent local government power.
Second, home rule's appearance on the Georgia local government scene
has diluted in no degree the court's traditional approach to legislative
grants of authority. That approach proceeds with single-minded
devotion to the interpretational technique of strict construction. In
considering the legislature's grant of local governmental power, the court
adamantly rejects a perspective of accommodation.
Rather, the
delegation's language receives a strict construction which, in the event
of doubt on the issue, resolves that doubt against the local government.
Home rule has thus failed generally to diminish the intensity of strict
construction; on the contrary, the court applies the technique in full
measure to the home rule system itself.
Finally, Georgia's home rule arrangement stands largely devoid of
definitive judicial elaboration. The first three decades of the system's
existence leave unresolved an astonishing assortment of pivotal doctrinal
issues. Until some amount of resolution occurs, by litigation or
otherwise, the ultimate overall success or failure of Georgia home rule
remains an open question.
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UTILIZATION OF THE SYSTEM

With the Georgia home rule system's formulation elaborated, and its
judicial treatment reviewed, inquiry now shifts to the issue of impact.
The impact issue in turn focuses primarily upon two considerations. The
first consideration goes to the tangible volume of utilization. To what
numerical extent do Georgia local governments actually employ the
system in dealing with their governmental needs and concerns? To what
extent, concomitantly, does the General Assembly, by local legislation,
continue to address those uniquely local affairs? Answers to those
inquiries will go far to reflect the system's practical worth in the daily
administration of local government.
The second consideration deals with the objects impacted. What
precise needs and concerns are addressed by local governments under
the power they derive from the home rule system? What facets of
governmental administration do local governments deem most appropriate (or inappropriate) for home rule disposition? Answers to those
inquiries will isolate the subjects of home rule impact. They are the
subjects which, in the absence of home rule, would have experienced
different treatment over the past three decades of local government
administration. Those subjects figure prominently in calculating the
substantive value of Georgia's home rule system.
For reflection upon both considerations, it is necessary to recall (yet
again) the Georgia system's two-tier delegations. At the first level, the
local government is empowered to adopt "clearly reasonable" measures
dealing with its local affairs but not changing state law.38 ° The system
does not require local governments to report these measures to any
outside source nor does it mandate their state-wide distribution.
Consequently, except within the local government itself, these measures
are generally unavailable for analysis.3"'
Under the second-tier
delegation, in contrast, the local government legislates to change existing
local statutes. 3 2 Under either procedure for effecting those changes
(governing authority or voter initiative), the system requires that the
adopted measure be filed with and annually published by the Secretary
of State.383 These are the measures available, therefore, for determining the impact of Georgia's home rule system.

380. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(a); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(a).
381. Virtually the only exception is when such measures result in litigation that goes
to the Georgia Supreme Court. That litigation has received discussion, supra.
382. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(1)(2); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b)(1)(2).
383. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(g); O.C.G.A. § 36-35-5.
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County Utilization

1. Numerical Utilization. The period of utilization here examined
begins with the Georgia home rule system's origin mid-way through the
1960 decade (1966) and continues through most of the 1990 decade
(through 1998). Thus, the 33 years studied fall within four different
decades, which in turn provide appropriate periods for measurement.
Both independently, and as contrasted, utilizations within these four
periods exude meaningful chronological guides for gauging system
impact.8 4
a. Getting Started: (1966 to 1970). As earlier described, the 1966
amendment to the Georgia Constitution extended home rule authority
directly to counties without the necessity of implementing legislation
from the General Assembly.385 That amendment empowered counties
(under the second-tier delegation) to adopt ordinances and resolutions
amending or repealing local statutes affecting the governing authority.3 s For virtually the last half of the 1960 decade, therefore, counties
enjoyed a power theretofore unknown in the annals of Georgia local
government law.
Perhaps counties were slow to receive the word on home rule
availability. Perhaps, although aware of availability, a healthy respect
for history cautioned against precipitant county utilization. Whatever
the reason(s), Georgia counties moved with extreme hesitancy to
embrace the new order. Indeed, the reports reveal that only one county
adopted one home rule measure from the time of the system's origin
until the end of the 1960 decade.
Table I indicates the period's lack of county home rule activity.

384. All the information here reported regarding local government measures adopted
under home rule comes from the actual examination of Volume II of the session laws
("Georgia Laws") of each session of the Georgia General Assembly. Any discrepancies that
may appear between the figures reported here and those in the actual volumes are the
result of human error. Hopefully, such errors have been held to the minimum.
385. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1.
386. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(b)(1)(2).
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TABLE I
County Home Rule Measures 1966 to 1970

Year

No. of County Measures

No. of Counties Effecting Measures

1966
1967
1968
1969
TOTAL:

b. Settling In: (1970 to 1980). With the turn of the decade, counties
cautiously felt their way into the new legal regime. Still in relatively
small numbers per year, but finally reflecting cognizance of availability,
county governing authorities ventured into the procedural labyrinth
prescribed by the home rule system. Utilizing those procedures, a
number of counties reported the adoption of measures amending or
repealing their local statutes. Indeed, during the ten-year period of
scrutiny, some 26 different counties registered the adoption of a total of
38 such measures.
Table II reflects the yearly activity of the decade.
TABLE II

County Home Rule Measures 1970 to 1980
Year

No. of County Measures

No. of Counties Effectina Measures

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
TOTAL:

c. Up and Running: (1980 to 1990). As they entered the decade of
the 1980s, counties broke the shackles of parliamentary reticence and
entered as full participants in the home rule legislating scenario.
Reflecting a governmental confidence heretofore lacking, more counties
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addressed more concerns via home rule than ever before. In numbers
approaching one-half of all Georgia counties, reports reflected home rule
adoptions on a range of local matters. A new comfort level obviously
pervaded county government, a mood signaling at least conditional
acceptance of modern home rule conveniences. By the conclusion of the
decade, some 69 different counties had adopted a total of 110 home rule
amendments or repeals. It assuredly was no sea change, but it was the
closest Georgia county government had yet come to a "new day" in the
exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Table III presents the annual developments throughout the decade.
TABLE IH
County Home Rule Measures 1980 to 1990
Year

No. of County Measures

No. of Counties Effecting Measures

1980

12

6

1981
1982

7
7

5
6

1983
1984

14
10

8
8

1985
1986

8
13

6
6

1987

10

9

1988
1989

26
3

12
3

110

69

TOTAL:

d. Continuing On: (1990 through 1998). Developments during the
first nine years of the present decade put counties on a pace roughly
holding their own. Reports reflect a continuing modest but persistent
pattern of legislating actions under home rule auspices. Although by no
means a landslide, a number of counties view the home rule system as
a convenient means for accomplishing at least some governmental needs
that require the change of existing local statutes. From 1990 through
the 1998 report, some 49 counties utilized their home rule authority to
adopt a total of 81 measures.
Table IV reflects the decade's activity thus far.
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TABLE IV

County Home Rule Measures 1990 through 1998
Year

No. of County Measures

No. of Counties Effecting Measures

1990
1991
1992

8
5
12

6
4
7

1993
1994
1995

10
9
7

5
6
5

1996

3

3

1997

12

5

1998

15

8

81

49

TOTAL:

e. Multiple Utilizations. As indicated by each year's report, some
counties adopt more than one home rule measure. For this reason, of
course, each decade's summary reflects fewer numbers of counties than
total measures. There may be interest, therefore, in the precise number
of counties within each decade that make multiple utilizations of their
home rule authority.
Table V reflects the number of counties that adopted three or more
home rule measures during the span of each decade.
TABLE V
Multiple County Utilization: A 33-Year Tabulation
Decade

No. of Multiple Utilizations

1966 to 1970
1970 to 1980

0
1 County:
4 Counties:

1980 to 1990

1 County:
1 County:

1990 to 1999

15 Amendments
3 Amendments Each
25 Amendments
13 Amendments

1 County:
1 County:

7 Amendments
6 Amendments

3 Counties:

4 Amendments Each

4 Counties:
1 County:

3 Amendments Each
16 Amendments

1 County:
1 County:
1 County:

15 Amendments
14 Amendments
6 Amendments

1 County:

5 Amendments

1 County:

3 Amendments

154

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

These tabulations reveal, therefore, that during the 1970 decade 5
counties were responsible for a total of 18 (47%) of the 38 county home
rule amendments adopted; that during the 1980 decade, 11 counties
adopted 58 (53%) of the 110 amendments reported; and that during the
1990 decade 6 counties accounted for 59 (73%) of the 81 amendments
adopted. When considered in this light, the total home rule utilizations
for each decade bode less impressive.
f. In Summary. These reports on tangible volume of utilization
reflect a general home rule aloofness on the part of Georgia counties.
Manifesting extreme caution at the point of origin, numerical utilization
increased only modestly during the system's first full decade of existence.
Experiencing a slight surge of activity around the turn of the 1980
decade, utilizations evidence a steady but unremarkable pace through
most of the 1990s. In sum, numerical utilizations of the past 33
years-an overall average of only 7 home rule measures each
year-constitute a disappointment. Although a number of counties
routinely employ the system to amend or repeal local statutes, a vast
majority of Georgia's 159 counties continue their annual trek to the
General Assembly. In 1998, for example, a year during which counties
adopted a total of 15 home rule measures, the General Assembly enacted
256 local statutes for specifically designated counties. Although some of
these statutes are assuredly still necessary for treating some governmental matters, a number of the needs addressed could likely have been
handled under the second-tier delegation of the county home rule
system.
Table VI presents a composite of numerical county home rule
utilizations from the system's inception to the present.
TABLE VI

County Home Rule Measures: A 33-Year Composite
Years

No. of County Home Rule
Measures Adopted

Average No. of
Measures Per Year

1966 to 1970

1

1970 to 1980
1980 to 1990
1990 to 1999

38
110
81

4
10
9

33 Years

230

7

0.25

2. Subject Utilization. With numerical utilization in place, the
impact focus shifts to subject matter coverage. This focus fixes those
facets of government affording the home rule system its substantive
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character. In mass, they manifest county home rule content over
Georgia's past three decades.
The impossibility of detailing the precise subjects of 230 measures
mandates broad classifications of governmental topics. Although even
these cannot include every subject treated, the categories will assist in
forming meaningful substantive impressions. They accurately illustrate
home rule's reach into the context of Georgia county government.
a. Decade 1960. With only one home rule measure reported by
counties within the first four years of the system's existence, the
substantive reach was limited indeed.
Table VII, simply for the sake of completeness, observes the subject
treated.38 7
TABLE VII

County Home Rule Subjects 1966 to 1970
Most Popular Home Rule Subjects
Personnel

No. of Measures Treating Subjects
1

b. Decade 1970. As counties took their first tentative steps into
home rule government, their scope of operations necessarily expanded.
Although the resulting 38 measures treated a range of governmental
needs and concerns, most fell within generally structured subject areas.
Table VIII reflects the subjects treated by home rule measures during
the decade."8 8

387. A measure pertaining to the clerk of the county commissioners.
388. "Governing Authority" includes measures dealing with such matters as the time
of meetings of the body, bonds for service, and prohibitions upon nepotism; "Pensions and
Retirement" includes measures dealing with such matters as changes in the pension act,
pension board investments, retirement amounts; "Merit System and Civil Service" includes
measures dealing with such matters as merit system councils, and changes in the civil
service system act; "Personnel" includes measures dealing with such matters as executive
assistants, county attorneys, and the establishment of a personnel board; "Finances"
includes measures dealing with such matters as auditors, and depositories of county funds;
"Purchasing" includes measures dealing with such matters as increasing the ceiling on
purchases. Classifications employed in further Tables are of the same nature and will not
be separately elaborated.
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TABLE VIII

County Home Rule Subjects 1970 to 1980
Most Popular Home Rule Subjects
Governing Authority
Pensions and Retirement
Merit System and Civil Service
Personnel

No. of Measures Treating Subjects
10
9
7
3

Finances

3

Purchasing

2

c. Decade 1980. With the surge of county home rule activity at the
inception of the 1980 decade, the subject matter encompassed a spectrum
of governmental functions. By virtue of these home rule legislating
ventures, numerous aspects of county administration received attention
and change.
Table IX indicates the system's more impressive reach during this
decade.
TABLE IX
County Home Rule Subjects 1980 to 1990
Most Popular Home Rule Subjects

No. of Measures Treating Subjects

Pension and Retirement

19

Governing Authority

16

Personnel
Merit System and Civil Service
Finances

12
10
8

Development
Purchasing

8
7

Taxation
Franchises and Licensing

7
5

Planning and Zoning

3

Streets
Utilities

2
2

d. Decade 1990. County home rule activity in the present decade
reveals greater concentration in relatively few subject areas. Indeed,
two general classifications ("Pensions and Retirement" and "Governing
Authority") account for more than half the total 81 home rule measures
adopted.
Table X reflects the relatively narrow reach of 1990 home rule
endeavors.
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County Home Rule Subjects 1990 to 1999

Most Popular Home Rule Subjects

No. of Measures Treating Subjects

Pensions and Retirement
Governing Authority
Finances
Merit System and Civil Service
Purchasing
Personnel
Judicial Matters

e. In Summary. Although numerically disappointing, county home
rule utilizations have touched a fairly broad range of governmental
functions. Even a rough effort at categorizing those functions provides
helpful insight into the process. The groupings isolate rather decisively
pivotal points within the governmental spectrum most impacted by the
shaping influences of the home rule phenomenon. For example, they
reveal Georgia county governments feel most comfortable in utilizing
home rule to reward the services of their officers and employees. Indeed,
measures dealing with "Pensions and Retirement" and "Merit System
and Civil Service" account for well over one-third of the total home rule
output. Other impressively impacted topics include the "Governing
Authority" itself, as well as "Personnel," "Finances," and "Purchasing."
In total, the focused topics realistically characterize Georgia's county
home rule content for the past three decades.
Table XI offers a composite of that characterization.
TABLE XI
County Home Rule Subjects 1966 through 1998
Subject

No. of Measures

Pensions and Retirement
Governing Authority
Merit System and Civil Service

61
37
24

(26%)
(16%)
(10%)

Personnel
Finances

20
19

(9%)
(8%)

Purchasing
Development

16
9

(7%)
(4%)

Taxation
Franchises and Licensing

8
5

(3%)
(2%)

Planning and Zoning
Judicial Matters

5
4

(2%)
(2%)

22

(11%)

Other

TOTAL:

230

(100%)

B.
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Municipal Utilization

Generally the approach previously employed to depict county home
rule utilization will be followed for municipalities as well. Both
treatments are, of course, necessary for a complete evaluation of
Georgia's home rule system. Additionally, the parallel utilization
structures should facilitate revealing comparisons and contrasts within
the system. As previously described, although the county and municipal
components bear overwhelming similarities, distinctions do punctuate
their origins and their details of formulation. Whether these distinctions
carry over into facets of utilization warrants analytical consideration.
Again, therefore, perusal begins at the beginning (1966) and ends at
the end (1998). Focused upon four periods comprising the years within
the four relevant decades, attention first devolves to municipal
numerical practices.
1. Numerical Utilization. Upon the General Assembly's enactment
of the Municipal Home Rule Act in 1965,389 the first report on employment of the statute appeared in 1966. As with counties, therefore, the
remainder of the 1960 decade provides the point of departure for
reviewing municipal utilization.
a. Getting Started: (1966 to'1970). Perhaps Georgia's municipalities
are by nature a bit more curious than its counties. Perhaps that
curiosity prompts a slightly more adventuresome spirit. Or perhaps the
primary distinction goes simply to numbers-there are so many more
cities than counties. Whatever the reason(s), municipalities reported
adoptions of home rule charter amendments from the system's inception.
Although the numbers scarcely overwhelmed, and a sense of governmental caution clearly prevailed, seven municipalities registered amendments in 1966. Moreover, a total of 45 measures materialized in the
first four years of the system's existence.
Table XII indicates the period's total municipal home rule activity.
TABLE XII
Municipal Home Rule Measures 1966 to 1970
No. of Municipal Measures
No. of Municipalities Effecting Measures
7
7
8
5
16
7
14
4

Year
1966
1967
1968
1969
TOTAL:

389.

45

O.C.G.A. § 36-35-1 to -8 (1993 & Supp. 1998).

23
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b. Settling In: (1970 to 1980). During the first full decade in which
they possessed home rule powers, municipalities employed their
authority in a gradually escalating pattern. Yearly utilizations ranged
from a low of 4 measures in 1972 to a high of 31 measures in both 1978
and 1979. As awareness of their home rule status expanded, municipalities exemplified a general willingness to experiment with charter
changes on a variety of fronts. By the conclusion of the 1970 decade, a
total of 115 municipalities registered total adoptions of 212 charter
amendments.
Table XIII reflects the yearly home rule activity of the decade.
TABLE XIII
Municipal Home Rule Measures 1970 to 1980
Year

No. of Municipal Measures

No. of Municipalities Effecting Measures

1970

12

6

1971
1972

18
4

7
3

1973
1974

22
26

12
11

1975

25

13

1976
1977

21
22

13
16

1978
1979

31
31

16
18

212

113

TOTAL:

c. Up and Running: (1980 to 1990). With the inception of the 1980
decade, municipal utilization leveled out to some degree of numerical
consistency. Although some fluctuations still occurred (from a low of 18
amendments in 1987 to a high of 54 amendments in 1988), the general
emerging pattern hovered at roughly 30 utilizations per year. By the
decade's conclusion, a total of 177 municipalities had reported the
adoptions of 305 charter amendments. Home rule, it appeared, claimed
a steadily increasing presence throughout the world of municipal
government.
Table XIV presents the decade's chronological history of utilizations.

160

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

TABLE XIV

Municipal Home Rule Measures 1980 to 1990
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
TOTAL:

No. of Municipal Measures

No. ofMunicipalities Effecting Measures

26
24
33
33
30
30
25
18
54
32
305

d. Continuing On: (1990 through 1998). Municipal utilizations
during the first nine years of the present decade have slowed. At their
current pace, adoptions will revert to a rate roughly comparable to that
of the 1970 decade. That result would in turn distinguish the 1980
decade as the one (of the four here surveyed) most hospitable to
municipal home rule utilization.
Whether the present decade's
experience constitutes an aberration or rather a forerunner of the future
remains to be seen.
Table XV reflects the decade's activity thus far.
TABLE XV
Municipal Home Rule Measures 1990 through 1998

Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

No. of Municipal Measures

No. of Municipalities Effecting Measures

22
13
23
14
32
24
4
16
39

TOTAL:

e. Multiple Utilizations. As with counties, some municipalities adopt

more than one home rule measure, thus causing each decade's summary
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to reflect fewer numbers of municipalities than total measures. There
may be merit, therefore, in indicating the precise number of municipalities in each decade that make multiple utilizations of their home
authority.
Table XVI reflects the number of municipalities adopting three or
more home rule measures during the span of each decade.
TABLE XVI
Multiple Municipal Utilizations: A 33-Year Tabulation

Decade

No. of Multiple Utilizations

1966 to 1970

1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:

1970 to 1980

1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
5 Municipalities:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:

1980 to 1990

1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
2 Municipalities:
2 Municipalities:
2 Municipalities:
2 Municipalities:
3 Municipalities:
2 Municipalities:
2 Municipalities:

1990 to 1999

1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
2 Municipalities:
1 Municipality:
1 Municipality:
2 Municipalities:
4 Municipalities:

Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures Each
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures
Measures Each
Measures Each
Measures Each
Measures Each
Measures Each
Measures Each
Measures Each
Measures
Measures
Measures Each
Measures
Measures
Measures Each
Measures Each
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These tabulations reveal, therefore, that during the 1960 decade, 3
municipalities were responsible for 31 (69%) of the 45 municipal home
rule charter amendments adopted; that during the 1970 decade, 14
municipalities were responsible for 153 (72%) of the 212 amendments
adopted; that during the 1980 decade, 20 municipalities were responsible
for 204 (67%) of the 305 amendments adopted; and that during the 1990
decade, 12 municipalities accounted for a total of 80 (43%) of the 187
amendments adopted. Once again, when considered in the light of these
multiple adoptions, total municipal utilizations per decade lose a
measure of their luster.
f In Summary. Georgia municipalities accepted with alacrity the
invitation tendered by the 1965 Home Rule Act for a degree of autonomy
in their local affairs. Although relatively few in number, and clearly
cautious in the exercise, municipalities reported home rule activity from
the system's inception. Amending their charters under the statute's
second-tier delegation, some 23 Georgia cities employed this unprecedented authority by the conclusion of the 1960 decade.
Although somewhat erratic, municipal home rule utilizations assumed
a gradually escalating pattern in succeeding years, displaying both
awareness of opportunity and receptiveness to experimentation.
Through the 1970's and at the conclusion of the 1980 decade, municipal
charter changes under the auspices of home rule authorization proceeded
apace. Although the present decade reflects a slowing of the activity, its
import is necessarily unclear. The experience may foretell the tapering
off of a movement never fully in gear; contrarily, it may represent only
a temporary lull between eras of home rule maturation.
To be sure, the municipal utilization record leaves a great deal to be
desired. During even its most impressive decade (1980-1990), only a
fraction of existing Georgia municipalities (177 of more than 400)
employed home rule authority to effect charter amendments. Moreover,
the General Assembly continues to enact local statutes covering all
manner of municipal concerns. In 1998, for example, a year during
which municipalities adopted a total of 39 charter amendments, the
General Assembly enacted 148 local statutes applying to specifically
designated municipalities. Accordingly, it appears evident that Georgia's
municipalities, like its counties, fail to fully exploit their home rule
status.
Table XVII presents a composite of numerical municipal home rule
utilizations from the system's inception until the present.
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TABLE XVII
Municipal Home Rule Measures: A 33-Year Composite
No. of Municipal Home Rule
Years

Measures Adopted

Average No. of
Measures Per Year

1966 to 1970
1970 to 1980

45
212

11
21

1980 to 1990

305

30.5

1990 to 1999

187

21

33 Years

749

23

2. Subject Utilization.

Accompanying the account of municipal

numerical practices, analysis now shifts to the subjects of those
utilizations. As with the counterpart consideration of the county
experience, broad classifications of governmental topics facilitate the
review. These categories, admittedly arbitrary, provide a necessary
handle for exploring home rule's substantive impact upon Georgia
municipal government.
a. Decade 1960. Municipal activity at the system's inception touched
a striking array of governmental functions. This fairly expansive
spectrum stood in considerable contrast to the early years of county
utilizations.
Table XVIII portrays the system's substantive reach into municipal
government during the first four years of its existence.39 °

390. Simply to afford illustration of some of the classifications established, "Personnel"
covers measures dealing with such topics as director of public works and planning director;
"Elections" covers measures dealing with such topics as annual elections and election
districts; "Pensions and Retirement" covers measures dealing with such topics as
employees' retirement, and pension systems; "Taxation" covers measures dealing with such
topics as ad valorem taxation, sewer assessments, and sanitary assessments; "Police"
covers measures dealing with such topics as board of public safety, police uniforms, and
fines; "Judicial Matters" covers measures dealing with such topics as recorder and
recorder's court; "Merit System and Civil Service" covers measures dealing with such topics

as merit system and classified service; "Streets" covers measures dealing with such topics
as streets and parking and transit; "Purchasing" covers measures dealing with such topics
as purchasing agent and purchase price of motor fuel; "Finances" covers measures dealing
with such topics as appropriations and director of finance. Other classifications apply to

similarly selected topics and will not be enumerated for each period reported.
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TABLE XVIII
Municipal Home Rule Subjects 1966 to 1970

Most Popular Home Rule Subjects
No of Measures Treating Subjects
Personnel
10
Elections
5
Pensions and Retirement
4
Taxation
4
Police
4
Judicial Matters
3
Merit System and Civil Service
2
Streets
2
Purchasing

2

Finances

2

b. Decade 1970.

The first full decade of the municipal home rule

experience substantially broadened its sphere of operations. Accordingly,
the magnitude of the resulting 212 charter amendments renders
summarization more difficult. Nevertheless, an arrangement of the more
popular subject areas will afford an impression of the era's substantive
coverage.
Table XIX reflects subjects treated by home rule measures during the
decade.
TABLE XIX
Municipal Home Rule Subjects 1970 to 1980
Most Popular Home Rule Subjects
Personnel
Pensions and Retirement

No. of Measures Treating Subjects
34
31

Governing Authority

22

Judicial Matters
Police
Merit System and Civil Service
Elections

21
13
11
11

Utilities
Finances

10
9

Taxation

8

Purchasing
Streets

7
5

Fire

5

c. Decade 1980. The 1980 decade encompassed the largest number
of municipal home rule measures for any period reported. With 305
charter amendments adopted by 177 different municipalities, the
classifications can indicate little more than the diversity of subjects
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treated. Those subjects stood in the front lines of the municipal home
rule evolution.
Table XX presents the arrangement of covered subjects for the 1980
decade.
TABLE XX

Municipal Home Rule Measures 1980 to 1990
Most Popular Home Rule Subjects
No. of Measures Treating Subjects
Governing Authority
70
Pensions and Retirement
45
Judicial Matters
40
Personnel
26
Police
18
Elections
12
Development

12

Taxation

11

Utilities

11

Streets
Purchasing
Franchises and Licensing

9
8
7

Merit System and Civil Service
Finances

5
5

d. Decade 1990. The apparent slackening of municipal home rule
charter changes during the present decade likewise worked a slight
reduction in subject diversity. The subjects receiving the most attention,
however, generally remained the same as those of previous decades.
Table XXI reflects the topical coverage of municipal home rule in
recent years.
TABLE XXI
Municipal Home Rule Measures 1990 to 1999
Most Popular Home Rule Subjects
No. of Measures Treating Subjects
Governing Authority
Elections
Pensions and Retirement

46
23
20

Personnel

18

Judicial Matters
Utilities
Finances
Purchases

15
11
10
8

Taxation

7

Franchises and Licensing

6

Development

6

Streets

4
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e. In Summary. Municipal home rule's reach into the corpus of
municipal government, as effected by charter changes for the past 33
years, reveals an impressive expanse. The subject matter groupings,
however tenuous or arbitrary, indicate that few basic governmental
functions remained beyond coverage. Exercising the home rule system's
unprecedented grant of authority, municipal governments legislated
where only the General Assembly previously trod. Although perhaps
numerically disappointing, the experience nevertheless stands in
remarkable contrast to Georgia's historic and ingrained aversion to local
government autonomy.
The groupings themselves expose subject areas of intense home rule
concentration. For example, the general topics of "Governing Authority"
and "Pensions and Retirement" draw roughly one-third of the total
charter changes. Indeed the top five objects of municipal attention
account for some 62% of the amending endeavors. The subjects observed
thus provide a compelling profile of Georgia's three-decade experiment
with municipal home rule.
Table XXII offers a substantive composite of that experiment.
TABLE XXH
Municipal Home Rule Subjects 1966 through 1998

Subject
Governing Authority
Pensions and Retirement

No. of Measures
139
100

(19%)
(13%)

Personnel
Judicial Matters
Elections
Police

88
79
51

(12%)
(11%)
(7%)

38

Utilities
Taxation
Finances

33
30

(5%)
(4%)
(4%)

Purchasing
Development

26
25
21

(3%)
(3%)
(3%)

Merit System and Civil Service
Streets
Franchises and Licensing

20
20
14

(3%)
(3%)
(2%)

Fire
Other

10

(1%)

55

(7%)

TOTAL:

749

(100%)
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C. Comparisons and Contrasts
Although anchored in distinctive legal foundations and couched in
differing details of formulation, the Georgia county and municipal home
rule systems are also highly similar. They emerge from a heritage of
decisional law which treats the local government entities in almost
identical fashion."9 ' Additionally, the systems have operated over
precisely the same period of time. With their separate utilization
histories elaborated, perhaps there is value in concluding comments on
commonality.
1.
Numerical Utilization. As previously recounted, counties
responded somewhat less enthusiastically than municipalities to home
rule's arrival on the Georgia local government scene. During the first
four years of the system's existence (1966 to 1970), only one county
employed its authorization to amend local statues. Over the same
period, in contrast, some 45 municipalities utilized the power of
changing their charters. In succeeding years, however, county utilization substantially increased. Indeed, considering the extent to which
municipalities outnumber counties, utilization records differ less than
they initially appear.
Table XXIII consolidates the two composites.
TABLE XXIH
Local Government Home Rule Measures: A 33-Year Comparison
Years
1960 Decade
1970 Decade
1980 Decade
1990 Decade
33 Years

County
Measures
1
38

Average
Per Year
0.25
4

Municipal
Measures
45
212

Average
Per Year
11
21

110
81

10
9

305
187

31
21

230

7

749

23

2. Subject Utilization. In utilizing their home rule powers to
amend and repeal local statutes, counties and municipalities have
touched fairly broad spectrums of governmental functions. These can be
depicted only by arbitrary groupings of general subject areas. The
tabulations locate rather decisively, however, those facets of local
government administration most affected by the home rule experience.

391.
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They thus supply substantive content to the most intriguing development in Georgia local government law over the past three decades.
Table XXIV presents a composite of the six most popular subjects for
county and municipal home rule treatment during the past 33 years.
TABLE XXIV
Local Government Home Rule's Most Popular Subjects:
1966 through 1998
County Subjects

No. of Measures

Municipal Subjects

No. of Measures

61 (26%)

Governing Authority

139 (19%)

37 (16%)

Pensions and Retirement

100 (13%)

Pensions and
Retirement
Governing

Authority
Merit System &

Personnel

88 (12%)

Personnel
Finances

20 (9%)
20 (9%)

Judicial Matters
Elections

79 (11%)
51 (7%)

Purchasing

16 (7%)

Police

38 (5%)

Civil Service

24 (10%)

V.

CONCLUSION

In 1875, in routine revision of its state constitution, Missouri
introduced the concept of "home rule" to American local government law.
With the ascendancy of Dillon's legislative supremacy "rule," Missouri's
innovation eventually claimed "next best thing" status to an "inherent
right" of local self-government. Now granted or authorized by most state
constitutions, home rule represents local government's best hope for
organizational independence. It is a hope, however, formulated in as
many fashions as the number of adopting jurisdictions.
In 1965, finally utilizing a 1954 constitutional authorization, Georgia
emerged on the home rule scene. Albeit in unique fashion, Georgia's
system encompassed both municipalities and counties; it also declared
numerous governmental matters beyond home purview. The system
effected its core grant of legislating power via an intriguing two-tier
delegation. At the vaguely structured first level, the local government
could deal with its property and affairs within the confines of existing
state law. The second-tier authorization empowered the local government to actually change state law.
As of 1966, therefore, the first year of its operation, the Georgia home
rule system raised expectations on two fronts: first, hopefully, utilization;
and second, assuredly, litigation.
For slightly more than three decades, the litigation has (somewhat
surprisingly) largely failed to plumb Georgia's home rule essence.
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Focusing, in the main, upon the system's specific grants and express
reservations, the cases present mere issues of inclusion or exclusion.
Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court simply locates the challenged
exercise within or without home rule coverage. The instances afford the
court virtually no opportunity for crafting or elaborating a judicial home
rule philosophy. The result is an ominous void in Georgia local
government law.
The report is similarly incomplete for home rule utilizations. Because
actions under the first-tier delegation receive no centralized publication,
their extent goes untabulated. Fortunately local government's secondtier legislating must be annually published. An analysis of those reports
yields a striking profile of Georgia home rule in action. Utilization
touched an impressive range of local government concerns, and (at least
until lately) the volume of utilization continued to increase. Although
too few local governments make full use of the system (old local statute
habits die hard), the potential is clearly present for change in the fabric
of Georgia local government law.
Whatever the ultimate fate of Georgia's home rule system, its twopronged issue of impetus will, both legally and politically, remain
indomitable: (1) to what extent home rule empowers the local government; and (2) to what extent home rule represses the state.

